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Executive Summary
This report provides a summary of current international experiences with financial
incentives for supporting technology development and identifies some important
implications for public policy in Thailand.
International experiences have demonstrated the broader public good that can be
achieved through policies and public interventions that stimulate technology learning
environments built around clusters or networks of firms and national support
institutions. Financial incentives serve as a mediating influence to enhance the flow of
knowledge from firms that are closer to a leading technological edge through to those
firms where technological skills are lagging. They are therefore an essential tool
available to governments in seeking to increase national technological capabilities and
international competitiveness.
Although a wide range of incentives for technology development is in place in
Thailand the system overall reflects a policy perspective that has not kept pace with
the changing demands of global environments. International experiences reflect the
need to target incentives where they will have maximum impact. This requires
targeting particular types and groups of firms and targeting the specific technology
thresholds relevant to their current levels of technology capabilities. It also implies the
need for incentive mechanisms that stimulate a demand for technology and skills
rather than focusing simply on their supply.
The report draws attention to the need to redirect the current system of incentives in
Thailand to place greater attention on efforts to enhance basic engineering and design
capabilities, building knowledge networks between large and smaller firms and
stimulating demand for technology upgrading.
Other weaknesses identified in the Thai system concern targeting, coordination and
promotion of the schemes and a lack of an overall evaluation framework.
Failure to come to terms with these issues will see Thailand fall further behind
economies such as Singapore and Taiwan in terms of national industrial technology
capability and skills, and in its ability to compete on the basis of ‘knowledge’ rather
than on other factors of production.
Three basic propositions provide a framework for revisions to the present system:
•
•
•

government financial incentives should support the full range of technology
capability building activities within the firm in an integrated manner;
incentives must be targeted at those industry sectors, firms and activities that
are likely to provide the greatest public benefit; and
the choice of particular form of incentive (tax incentive, loan, grant) is a
tactical decision that must take account of local circumstances

The main emphasis in the recommendations is on developing more effective targeting
and coordination of schemes and generating more flexibility to enable firms to
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progress through different stages of technology development. Recommendations are
made under five key headings
•

Revising financial incentives for skills development and training;
Recommendation 1
Large firms should be encouraged to become actively involved in training. This
could be achieved through their representation on the SDF Board and through
their involvement in collaborative training arrangements. For example the new
Skills Development Fund could target specific incentives for in-house training by
MNCs for staff of other companies to allow them to act as training suppliers for
their industry.
Recommendation 2:
As the SDF develops there should be mechanisms to ‘hold the hand’ of smaller
companies by setting up training courses and funding company employees to
attend them. This could be achieved through cash contracts or grants to training
suppliers (who could be large firms, universities, GRIs) to provide specific
courses for groups of SMEs. There is no point in funding companies if the
required training courses do not exist – parallel support for the development of the
‘training industry’ is also essential.
Recommendation 3:
Assistance with the analysis of training needs, development of training strategies
and identification of appropriate training providers appears absolutely essential
for SMEs. The SDF must devote much of its resources to building this
fundamental planning capacity within firms. This has been regarded as one of the
most successful aspects of SDF schemes elsewhere, and also a critical component
of many incentive schemes that fund consultants to work with companies on
planning for their strategic needs. We recommend that a proportion of funds be
allocated specifically for this activity.
Recommendation 4
The SDF Board should work closely with the private sector to identify priority
areas in which training funds should be concentrated. This process should take
account of priority sectors already identified by the government and priorities forshadowed by the National Competitiveness Committee. Such priorities should be
elaborated only after consultation with the private sector and in the light of indepth research.

•

Recommendations for stimulating SMEs to improve technology capability by
undertaking design and engineering activities
Recommendation 5:
The definition of R&D payments should be extended to cover all in-house
R&D performed by the firms themselves, not only within a firm’s registered
R&D ‘organisation’ or approved institution as under present arrangements.
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Recommendation 6:
For SMEs only, the definition of R&D under current financial incentives
should be extended to cover technology development activities such as design
and engineering activities that contribute more widely to enhanced
productivity and competitiveness and not just activities directly linked to R&D
as is the case at present.
Recommendation 7:
We recommend that the programs of matching grants offered through NSTDA
schemes such as CD, ITAP, MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC, and through the
DIP of the Ministry of Industry schemes such as ITB, Project 13 or MDIC.
should be strengthened and be given greater flexibility in order to provide
greater incentives for SMEs.
•

Building flexibility and options for incremental and progressive technology
development into the system
Recommendation 8:
We recommend the Innovation Development Fund be given a high level of
support from government and that it be established as an independent agency
under its own Act. Its activities should be coordinated with the delivery of
matching grants (or credits) through funds provided through NSTDA, DIP and
the newly formed OSMEP. Coordination could be achieved by allocating
responsibility to IDF or OSMEP for collating information on project delivery,
monitoring and evaluation. This agency should report directly to the National
Competitiveness Committee on monitoring and targeting technology
incentives in priority sectors.
Recommendation 9:
We recommend building in greater flexibility to those schemes directed
toward enhancing engineering and design capability through the introduction
of ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’ available on a matching
basis and available only to SMEs.
Recommendation 10:
We recommend that the grants-based schemes available through NSTDA and
DIP should be given greater budget flexibility to enable funds to be transferred
between schemes according to demands within firms and the effective
implementation of the ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’.
Recommendation 11:
We recommend that the activities undertaken through the BUILD VMC
programme be closely coordinated with the grants-based schemes available
through NSTDA and DIP, thereby marrying the linkage development efforts
with the technological development support services.
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•

Enhancing the delivery impact and coordination of grant-based schemes
Recommendation 12:
Financial sector organisations (such as the SME bank) should be contracted to
act as administrative and possibly also decision-making intermediaries
between the private sector claimants and the public sector funding agencies.
Recommendation 13:
We recommend that the budget directed toward increasing technology
capabilities to firms other than for R&D should be increased to a level
approaching 15 percent of the national S&T budget. This should provide
sufficient stimulation for Thai firms to generate the capacity to more
effectively absorb and build on the technology capabilities of more advanced
firms and S&T institutions.
Recommendation 14:
A single government agency such as the Office of SME Promotion should be
identified as the first point of contact for all schemes providing financial
incentive for R&D, technology acquisition and development, and technical
skills and training. The agency should have the task of publicising the schemes
and disseminating information on eligibility, guidelines for funding etc. and
for coordinating applications. Administration of the schemes would remain
with existing Department (such as BOI and MOF schemes).
Appropriate industry liaison bodies should be co-opted to deliver information
on the schemes to their members/constituents.

•

The drive for national competitiveness.
Recommendation 15:
We recommend that a ‘policy forum for technology development incentives’
be established with representatives of all key agencies involved in the delivery
of financial incentives for technology and skills development. The IDF and
OSMEP would be appropriate agencies to initiate such a forum that should
also have strong private sector representation. The forum should undertake to
coordinate the scope and delivery of the incentives, and develop a strategy for
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of the schemes. It should also
undertake to advise the National Competitiveness Committee and the Office
for SME Promotion on the scope and impact of the financial incentives system
and the level of financial resources required to support an effective incentives
regime.
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Improving the System of Financial Incentives for
Enhancing Thailand’s Industrial Technological
Capabilities
1.

Introduction to the study

1.1

Background

The Thailand Country Partnership for Competitiveness has identified science and
technology as a high priority for development. As part of this process the World
Bank, together with the Thai government, have been exploring strategies for
enhancing technological capability for industrial development.
Government policies and the institutional framework in support of technology
development in Thai firms were recently reviewed for the World Bank by a team led
by Technopolis of the United Kingdom (Arnold et al, 2000). This study found that
technology and innovative capabilities in Thailand have lagged well behind
comparable Asian countries. For example, their report drew attention to the
observation that the current intensity of R&D performed by business enterprises in
Thailand lags around 10-15 years behind the level in Korea in the early 1980s when
that country had a similar level of industrial and manufacturing development as
contemporary Thailand. The intensity of business-performed R&D in Thailand would
need to be increased to around 20 times its present level in order to ‘catch up’ with the
intensity in Korea at that corresponding earlier stage of industrial development.
In order to maintain a leading edge in technology capability, industrially developed
countries around the world have made use of a wide range of policy incentives and
institutional structures to encourage technology learning and innovation in firms and
publicly funded support institutions. Many countries have made use of taxation
incentives, loans, grants and skills development schemes to maintain technological
competitiveness in firms. The mechanisms for delivery and focus of incentives for
technology development in different countries has varied; so too have their success.
However, an important observation that that can be made is that incentive
mechanisms have delivered maximum benefit when they have been carefully targeted
and directed toward the critical technology thresholds faced by firms in the countries
in which the policy instruments are introduced.
The Phase 1 study found that for firms in Thailand, at its present stage of
technological development, the most important thresholds of technological capability
that firms need to cross are not concerned with formally organised R&D but with
other technology development and learning activities:
•
•

•

For larger firms, they were about building design and engineering capabilities
as a basis for starting significant technology development activities;
For the majority of SMEs, especially in traditional industries, they were about
increasing the efficiency with which existing technologies were acquired, used
and operated.
Only a few firms had the capability to move forward to R&D activities.

1
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Overall, the study identified a need to build up firm-based innovative activities and
capabilities, to encourage learning-based activities within, and collective effort among
firms, to link with and exploit the technology development activities of MNCs and
using policies on FDI to influence technological behaviour.
The study suggested that grant-based incentives, if designed and applied
appropriately, might be more effective in the Thai context than tax incentives, and
recommended that two further issues should be thoroughly examined in order to
improve existing grant-based schemes:
1. Whether and how a simple and flexible grant-based mechanism could be put in
place to stimulate firms to undertake technology development activities involving
forms of design and engineering work that would not meet the eligibility
conditions of the existing R&D tax incentive system.
2. Whether and how a flexible grant-based mechanism could be established in order
to assist firms invest in training and related capability building activities
concerned with strengthening their human resources for design, engineering and
R&D.
These two issues provide key questions for the present (‘Phase 2’) study. The overall
objective is to investigate and identify ways to improve the incentive structure for
stimulating industrial technology development by reviewing Thailand’s fiscal
incentive regime and providing recommendations on the design of more effective,
flexible, grant-based mechanisms and supporting institutional and legal infrastructure.
The scope of the study is covered under the following terms of reference:
•
•
•

1.2

Analysing and improving grant-based mechanisms to stimulate firms to undertake
design and engineering activities;
Analysing and devising grant-based mechanism to assist firms invest in ‘learning
intensive’ training and related capability building activities; and
Reshaping existing enabling laws and grant-providing institutions and/or
establishing new ones.

Approach to the project

The first task for the present study was to carry out a review of international
experiences with financial incentives for driving technology capability and learning in
comparable countries. These experiences were then used to provide benchmark for the
analysis of the Thai system and to develop a strategy for action to improve their
performance in Thailand
A second and parallel task was to review the Thai system of incentives for enhancing
technology capability. This part of the study was not an in-depth review of individual
schemes and their management or effectiveness. Rather, it was a review of the
schemes as a whole and how they compare with developments and experiences in the
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internal context. The international benchmarks and a set of ‘diagnostics’, described in
more detail below, was used as a framework for the review and analysis

1.3

Developments since the Phase 1 study

Two significant developments relevant to the present study have occurred since Phase
1 of the present study was completed. The first of these has been the drafting of
legislation for The Science and Technology Act to provide a legal framework for S&T
agencies (both private and public) for the implementation and coordination of S&T
development. A major feature of the Bill, likely to go before parliament over the next
year, is that it will broaden the scope of the National Science and Technology Policy
Committee in the area of budgetary approval for S&T projects and establish the
Office of National S&T Policy. The Office when it becomes established will be an
autonomous agency providing advice on S&T planning and policy, human resource
development for S&T, and a range of activities to promote research and development
and technology transfer.
A second development, also with implication for the present study, has been the
development of legislation for the Thailand Skill Development Fund (SDF) Act. The
new Skill Development Fund when it comes into operation will apply a levy of up to
1 per cent of the payroll on firms that do not carry out ‘adequate training’ as
determined by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. The levy is thus an
incentive to encourage firms to carry out their own training either in-house in
collaboration with training providers or externally through training providers. This
latter development is important in the context of the present project because it will
provide a potential new mechanism for providing training that is in demand by firms
for raising the capacity to absorb new technology.

1.4

Outline of the report

Following this introductory section, the substance of the report is presented in three
parts:
Chapter 2 of this report provides a summary of current international experiences with
financial incentives for supporting technology development. The review identifies
some important trends in public policy and an urgent need in Thailand to catch up
with developments elsewhere in the region.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of current schemes and identifies some major issues
and areas where the system as a whole could be made more effective.
The final chapter outlines a strategy and recommendations for improving the Thai
system and bringing it more into line with the current technological challenges and
opportunities facing Thailand today. It is recommended that this can be achieved
through more strategic targeting of schemes to enable the incentive system to be more
effective in stimulating technological learning and technology upgrading in Thai
firms.
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2.

Financial Incentives for Enhancing Technology Capability:
international experiences and trends

2.1

The challenge of industrial technology and innovation environments

The global industrial innovation environment of the 2000s is vastly different from that
which predominated around two decades ago (the period in which science and
technology policies in South-East Asia were attracting considerable interest and
support from national governments). These differences have led to some new
approaches for supporting innovation and technology development. Some particularly
significant observations have contributed to these new approaches. They include the
following.
•

•

•

•

•

•

A recognition that there is little national economic benefit in strengthening
knowledge producing and support institutions independently from technology
capacity building in wealth creating firms. This has reinforced a growing
trend among governments to focus explicitly on firms as the prime agents of
innovation supported by specialist capabilities and technical services provided
by public institutions.
The majority of important decisions within firms concerning what to
produce and how to produce it are crucially influenced by the way in which
the owners and managers of firms respond to the incentives available to
them. There has been a growing emphasis in most countries to design and
introduce financial incentives to stimulate technology development in firms that
can maximise the flow of technical skills and knowledge throughout (as well as
beyond) the sector in which they are operating.
A recognition that learning and technology acquisition is a continuous,
cumulative and incremental process. Associated with this has been the need to
bridge local, national and international knowledge and innovation systems,
rather than focusing on developing an isolated national innovation system.
A recognition of the importance of industry clustering in the process of
collective acquisition of skills and the diffusion of technology among smaller
firms. This has moved the policy focus away from single sectors and toward the
identification of clusters of sectors and interacting firms and institutions and
emphasised the salience of knowledge networks rather than simply technology
itself in driving innovation.
Technological systems vary in character and extent within national
economies and consequently lead to different technological capabilities; In some
regions there are particularly dynamic innovation environments where
information and knowledge are rapidly diffused. This raises the capacity of
firms and support institutions and reduces uncertainty and risk.
While the globalisation of multi-national firms has progressed there has been a
trend toward increased localisation of many decisions within these firms and an
industrial reliance on knowledge intensity rather than capital or labour
intensity.

This changing environment has demanded new ways of ‘thinking about’ industrial
technology policy in the context of a ‘global knowledge economy’. They imply new
ways of formulating and implementing policies for raising and diffusing technological
4
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capability and for overcoming barriers within firms to technology upgrading.
Responses to these demands from the more advanced industrialising countries in Asia
has been to move toward the introduction of financial incentives for supporting
technology learning, development and diffusion through firms - as the key agents
driving technology development - rather than through the provision of services
provided through public institutions. The rationale has not been simply to provide
financial assistance to firms to upgrade their technological capabilities.. It has been to
generate an environment in which technological learning becomes a necessity for
firms right along the value chain. Thus, an increasingly rich array of policy
instruments and mechanisms have been focused on stimulating demand for
technology development in firms rather than simply supplying capacity building
services through public institutions.
This has not meant that public institutes become less relevant - rather, it has meant
that they become more relevant. This is because their services and support structures
can be more effective with the introduction of new measures to strengthen the demand
for technology within firms and their capacity to absorb, use and diffuse technology.
This policy transition can be described as moving toward:
(a) an enterprise-based system of financial incentives for enhancing industrial
technology capabilities; and
(b) a dual system of incentives that strengthens support institutions in parallel with
the capacity of industrial firms to build on that support and engage in technology
learning and development.
(c) This has given rise to a third policy emphasis concerned to build closer interaction
and mutual interdependence between the enterprise system and the support
institutions.
Thailand has lagged behind in making this transition and as a consequence is behind
many other Asian economies in terms of building up industrial technological
capability within firms. This is in spite of concerted efforts of government over the
past two decades to develop an appropriate infrastructure to support science and
technology for industrial development. Evidence from other countries and different
sectors have demonstrated that firms in newly industrialising countries can begin in
the middle of the innovation cycle and catch up to global competitors.
In many cases clearly targeted policies have been extremely successful in enabling
firms to cross critical technology thresholds. The experiences of countries such as
Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong show that followers don’t always have to be
laggards. However, the evidence also shows that the ‘latecomers’ and their
governments must go through a series of difficult technology development transitions.
Economies, such as Chinese Taipei, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Malaysia
have, in contrast to Thailand, been far more effective in ‘capturing’ technological
capability and diffusing this capability, through people and the firms in which they
work, for the benefit of their economies and their societies more generally. The policy
environment over which their governments have influence has been a vital factor in
their success.
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The following brief stories illustrate the different ways that economies can turn
policies toward achieving technological goals, but in quite different ways according to
their different levels of technology capability and the prevailing industrial and
institutional infrastructure. Malaysia (Exhibit 1) and Singapore (Exhibit 3) illustrate
strategies that have focused on the role of MNCs and their supply chains, especially in
Singapore. Hong Kong (Exhibit 2) illustrates a laissez faire policy which is now being
augmented by government support for the scientific and knowledge infrastructure.
South Korea (Exhibit 4) is a case where policy has been strongly directed by
government through conglomerations of local firms.
Some valuable underlying lessons for Thailand, in its present phase of industrial
development, can be drawn from these cases. The first concerns the need to have a
flexible system capable of responding to changing technological demands as global
and local technological and business environments change. This generally results in a
rich variety of schemes that has the capability to evolve over time and explicitly
capture the externalities and spillover benefits inherent in skill and technology
development activities. A second concerns the need to coordinate the promotion
and delivery of incentives in order that they can collectively contribute toward
stimulating and supporting firms to cross critical technology thresholds that will
maximise impact. Thirdly, the cases vividly illustrate that technology development
and diffusion can be maximised by targeting incentives toward groups of firms
that include large and small operators along the value chain. Flows of technology,
skills and knowledge can be leveraged by carefully targeting incentives toward
different groups of firms and institutions and in particular by drawing larger firms
more centrally into the diffusion process. A fourth and salient lesson is that most
countries are already aggressively promoting the development of technology-based
clusters and networks through targeted financial incentives. Unless countries such as
Thailand also make such investments they will become more peripheral to the centres
of dynamic productive activity that are currently driving industrial innovation in the
region.
Exhibit 1: Malaysia – the search for spillovers
Since Malaysia achieved independence in the 1960s, the role of technology in development
policy has evolved greatly. In particular, in the mid 1980s, the government embarked on a
large-scale program to promote industrialisation through technological development in
targeted industries. As a result of dissatisfaction with the failure to date of investments by
MNCs to provide substantial spillovers, public R&D expenditures were centralised in the
Fifth Malaysia Plan of 1986-90 and the Intensification of Research in Priority Areas
programme of 1986. Increased private sector input was provided as a result of the Action Plan
for Industrial Technology Development (1990).
Although government spending on R&D more than doubled between 1986 and 1995 and
public sector technology institutes expanded greatly, a feeling arose that activities had
become excessively centralised and bureaucratised and that, as a result, they were not
sufficiently efficient in meeting industrial needs. To counteract these tendencies and to
harness technological dynamism in the private sector, from 1993 government policy took a
new direction. In order to encourage the creation of industrial clusters, the Malaysian
government sought increasingly to gain spillovers from MNCs operating locally. In a policy
similar to Singapore’s, the government has tried to promote technological advance in
indigenous firms that belong to subcontracting networks centred on foreign firms (largely
from Japan or East Asian NICs) with manufacturing operations in Malaysia.
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Through keiretsu-like structures, small local firms are meant to gain resources to upgrade
their technological skills and reduce Malaysia’s high level of dependence on labour-intensive
operations. A cluster in Penang, built on disk-drive firms that had migrated from Singapore,
has been viewed as especially successful. A more recent phenomenon, the Multimedia Super
Corridor, is currently receiving large funding from the Malaysian government in order to
generate another private-public cluster.
Although it is too early to evaluate these initiatives fully, there are concerns that, in reality,
the spillovers from MNCs to indigenous firms are less than had been hoped. Moreover, the
thinness of the local pool of skilled and educated labour may create a bottleneck to further
rapid development if MNCs capture the bulk of the skilled workforce and, as a consequence,
crowd out locally-based firms that wish to participate in technological upgrading. This had led
to calls for an immediate and substantial growth in the infrastructure devoted to training and
education.

Exhibit 2: Hong Kong – development with low levels of government direction
From the 1960s onwards, the Hong Kong economy developed rapidly as measured in terms of
per capita GDP. This was accomplished with very little government intervention, especially in
the manufacturing sector.
After the late 1970s, the government began to direct more attention to the micro-economy.
For example, in 1982, the Industrial Development Board was establish. Alongside the Board
have been other groups such as the Hong Kong Productivity Council. Even when taken
together, however, their activities are still very modest by the standards of most other
countries. Instead, generalised incentives including comparatively low rates of corporate and
government taxation have continued to feature prominently in development policy.
Despite the prosperity that Hong Kong has achieved, the policy has had mixed results from a
technological point of view. The manufacturing sector in Hong Kong is still concentrated
largely in low-technology industries such as textiles. As both labour and land costs in Hong
Kong have increased, locally based manufacturing activities have been priced out of the
market to a substantial extent. Instead, a number of Hong Kong concerns have become
‘hollow’ firms, which maintain their administrative and development activities in Hong Kong
but have transferred their factories further afield, primarily into adjacent parts of China.
On the other hand, there has been substantial upgrading in the consumer electronics industry
as a number of Hong Kong firms have switched from sole reliance on OEM contracts to
introduce their own brand names for export. These firms often have technical departments in
which they develop features to make their goods more attractive to customers.
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Exhibit 3: Singapore – technology transfer by TNCs
In contrast to Hong Kong’s reliance on locally-owned firms that acted as OEMs, Singapore
encouraged foreign companies to set up operations and to use Singapore as an export base for
third markets. In the words of Lee Kuan Yew (1976, quoted in Chiu, et al., 1997, 127-128);
‘From 1965, when Singapore became independent on her own, we have had to constantly
review and revise our policies. The fundamental issue was how were we to make a living as a
nation on our own. We have found one answer to this in rapid industrialization, encouraging
industrialists of the advanced countries to export not manufactured goods to Singapore for reexport, but their factories, technological management expertise and marketing know-how.
Despite the growing share of TNCs, the government became concerned about long-term
prospects in the late 1970s and 1980s. Worries centred on a number of factors including rising
wages and land prices, relatively low productivity growth, increased European and American
resistance to imports of textiles and garments, and the need to maintain a strong Singapore
dollar in order to bolster the important financial services sector. The government, therefore,
industries with higher rates of productivity growth and greater long-term potential than some
current industries. To free up labour, the government decreed wage increases higher than
could be justified by traditional levels of productivity increase in sectors such as textiles and
garment manufacturing. Given the relative technological backwardness of locally-owned
firms, therefore, the government encouragement of technology upgrading and restructuring
involved further emphasis on the recruitment of TNCs in appropriate industries.
Branches of electronics such as semi-conductor manufacturing and software have benefited
from government policy, which explicitly targets sectors seen as strategic to the local
economy. In addition to encouragement of investment by foreign firms, policy has also been
directed towards modernization of the indigenous sector through the Local Industry
Upgrading Programme, which is intended to increase the rate of technology transfer to
locally-owned firms. A further arm of technology policy is the National Science and
Technology Board (NSTB), which was established in 1991 to generate a world-class
technology base in selected sectors. Among other activities, the NSTB sponsors and
coordinates government research institutes.

Exhibit 4: Korea – centralised direction in technological change
As Korea evolved from a very poor country in the late 1950s to one of substantial prosperity
in the 1990s, its policies towards the encouragement of technological change have also
evolved. In the 1970s, Korean policy emphasized the maintenance of management control in
Korean hands. As a result, neither Foreign Direct Investment nor licensing of foreign
technologies were highly approved by the government. Instead, technology policy revolved
around reverse engineering and imports of foreign-made capital goods, financed for the most
part by borrowing funds from abroad. Through reverse engineering, Korean firms (many of
them large, diversified chaebol that could achieve economies of scale) were able to develop
skills internally, although this worked only for mature industries in which intellectual
property was widely available. Both industries and firms were selectively targeted by
government technocrats, but management competence was insisted upon as chaebols could
easily lose government support if they did not use their resources efficiently. Education and
training received high levels of government support, but these were matched by very high
levels of private support as students and their parents willingly invested their own funds in
educational endeavours.
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Subsequently, as Korea has moved beyond its reliance on mature industries, government
policy has shifted more to the acquisition of cutting-edge knowledge and the development of
indigenous capabilities. As foreign firms have often been unwilling to surrender their
competitive advantage by licensing the most up-to-date knowledge, this has forced Koreans to
engage in their own advanced R&D in order to continue technological upgrading. The
government has supported this upgrading through its Industrial Generic Technology
Development Project, National R&D Project, and Highly Advanced National R&D Project.
The latter, also known at the G-7 Project, is intended to raise Korea’s technological
capabilities to a par with those of the G-7 countries by 2020.
Much of the funding for these projects is channeled through Government Research Institutes
(GRIs) that aim to build in-depth technological capabilities in designated industries. R&D by
private firms is also emphasized, and there is a concentration of both GRIs and private R&D
facilities in Taedok Science Town (although not one that meets world standards). Since 1980
the government has also increased its efforts to promote technological upgrading by SMEs.
While Korea’s centrally-directed technology policy coincided with enormous growth in its
early decades (the high period of what Chalmers Johnson has termed ‘the developmental
state’ in relation to Japan), Kim (2000) has blamed some of Korea’s more recent troubles on
excessive centralisation in the hands of bureaucrats who are no longer in touch with modern
needs. As a result, he contends that the National Innovation System Korea has become too
rigid and should be reformed. One message that could be drawn from Korea’s experience is
that, although centralisation of innovation policy may work well in a relatively small
economy whose efforts are based on the assimilation of knowledge concerning mature
industries, centralisation becomes less appropriate as technological complexity increases.

2.2

Financial incentives for technology development and innovation in firms:
Why and how?

The economic rationale for public financial support for R&D and technology
development and innovation within firms relies on arguments of ‘market failure’
flowing from particular characteristics of these activities.1 There is also a strong case
for public support to overcome ‘system failure’ in terms of deficiencies in the broader
system of innovation and knowledge institutions and infrastructure of the country by
comparison with competitor economies. Both arguments can be applied to Thailand.
The rationale for introducing publicly funded incentives is based on achieving broad
social benefit, not on providing benefits for individual firms (although these may also
occur) and the recognition that without subsidies social benefit will not be realised
because of ‘market failure’. Two forms of market failure are recognised:
•

1

Externalities and spillovers: Private firms operating under market conditions
under-invest in technology development relative to the level that would be
socially desirable. This is because of the difficulty of appropriating the benefits of
knowledge and because of spillovers of the benefits of new technology (such as
higher quality products, or lower prices to consumers). Government’s role is to
stimulate higher levels of investment up to the point where the marginal cost
equals the marginal social return.

This summary is taken from the Phase 1 report (pp. 73-5).
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•

Other market imperfections: Uncertainty and risk in technology investment per se,
and compared with other kinds of investment may lead companies to be overcautious and invest less than is perhaps justified by the potential private return.

The second form of market failure is magnified in the case of industrialising countries
like Thailand. Here, firms are less likely than firms in industrialised countries to be
experienced in assessing the costs and future private returns from their investment in
technology. Further, they face greater difficulty in gaining access to the necessary
skills and resources at a predictable cost. This makes technological learning more
complex, and the activity of innovation more risky than in ‘experienced’ firms in
industrialised countries.
Economists also recognise that the particular source of the ‘innovation market failure’
varies with the type of innovation (diffusion of existing technology, incremental
improvement, radical science-based technology) and that each requires a different
policy response (Martin and Scott, 2000).
The case for providing public support for technology development and innovation
within firms because of ‘system failure’ recognises that many of the ‘building blocks’
of the innovation system are missing or poorly developed and a practical policy
requires government to create them. The rationale for policy action in this case is put
forward by Keith Smith, who argues that market based systems:
…not only suffer from an under-supply of knowledge, but are like to actually
generate areas of systematically weak performance. These areas of ‘systemic
failure’ may call for actions contrary to conditions of perfect competition, for
example, cooperation and collaboration between firms to facilitate knowledge
flows, government regulation and the creation of incentives. (Smith, 1998: p.
41).
Four categories of ‘system failure’ have been identified: failures in infrastructure
provision and investment (both physical infrastructures like telecommunications and
‘knowledge’ infrastructures like technical institutes and regulatory bodies); transition
failures (e.g. difficulties that firms have in adapting to technological change); ‘lockin’ failures (caused by the difficulty of discarding existing techno-economic
systems); and institutional failures (regulatory and intellectual property framework,
corporate law etc).
In addition to these arguments for public intervention there is also the pragmatic
argument that, for whatever reason, other countries – industrial and industrialising
countries that Thailand is in competition with –have accepted the above arguments for
intervention both for the ‘system’ and for firms.. They are providing incentives for
technology development and learning within firms, and businesses. Thailand will be
further disadvantaged if the Government does not match the incentives available
elsewhere.2

2

The Phase 1 report went further in finding that opposition to financing these activities in firms was a
fundamental obstacle to strengthening technology development within enterprises.
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Finally, international experiences have demonstrated the broader public good that can
be achieved through policies and public interventions that stimulate technology
learning environments built around clusters or networks of firms and national support
institutions. Financial incentives that build knowledge flows through firms engaged at
different levels through the value chain serve to benefit all firms in the chain, not just
the initial or direct beneficiaries of incentives. An important observation is that the
financial incentives can serve as a mediating influence to enhance a flow of
knowledge between firms that are closer to a leading technological edge through to
those firms where technological skills are lagging. This is illustrated in Exhibit 5
below.

Exhibit 5:
Financial Incentives for Technology Development:
Adjusting the Learning Environment
Weak Learning Environment

Status of Firms’ Technology
Capability

Status of Firms’ Level of
Competitiveness

Low

Financial Incentives
Regime Promotes
Knowledge Flows
and Learning

Laggers

Improvers

Leaders
High

Dynamic Learning Environment

International experience shows that the new global environment demands a dual
approach to supporting technology development and innovation. There is a need for
programs and initiatives that strengthen support institutions while at the same time
supporting the capacity of industrial firms to build on that support and engage in
technology learning and development. Policy makers must recognise that wealth is
created by applying knowledge and not simply generating new knowledge.
Each side of this dual approach demands a different set of incentive mechanisms. The
success of the incentives in generating the maximum possible social benefit depends
on achieving integration and coordination between the two approaches. Unless firms
have the capacity to make use of and build on the technological resources available
through support institutions, investments in support institutions will return minimal
socio-economic benefit. Similarly, the technological services available through
support institutions will carry little benefit for firms if they are not directed or aligned
with firms’ current technology and market capabilities - firms have no option but to
start from where they are. Many countries in the region have crossed critical
technology thresholds not by providing additional support through public support
institutions but by turning attention to incentives to encourage firms to make use of
existing support mechanisms.
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2.3

Financial incentives for building capability in firms: investing in the
future

There are advantages and disadvantages inherent in different forms of incentive – tax
concessions, loans, and grants – as summarised in Table A1, Attachment 1. However,
it is quite possible to design tax incentive and grant schemes that both operate in
essentially the same way. Although tax concessions are commonly more ‘horizontal’
than grants or loans, there is no particular reason why grant schemes have to be more
‘selective’ than tax incentives.3 This leads many countries to offer a carefully
integrated portfolio of financial incentives, each with different targets in term of the
eligible activities supported and the class of firms or industries eligible to receive
them.
Within firms, technological capabilities can be thought of as three interlocking sets of
competencies: production capability (management and engineering); project
execution (feasibility, training, execution); and innovation capability (Table A2,
Attachment 1); or more succinctly as ‘the skills, technical knowledge and
organisational coherence required to make industrial technologies function in an
enterprise’.4 Technological capability is perhaps revealed most clearly when firms are
faced with the need to innovate, to change their products, their processes or their
technological organisation.
Firms in developing economies (indeed, innovating firms in all economies) generally
need to strengthen all three types of capabilities. As a rule, however, it is not
feasible for firms in developing economies to achieve capabilities at the highest levels
because they are not in a position to operate at the cutting edge of technology. In
addition, substantial gains in per capita income may be attained simply by switching
from low-productivity, labour intensive activities to ones that involve somewhat
higher degrees of capital intensity and workforce skill. Examples drawn from
Singapore and Malaysia and presented in Attachment 3 offer some good examples of
effective skills development programs.
While it is possible for firms from developing economies to generate high-technology
knowledge and skills eventually, as in the Korean semiconductor industry, this is
time-consuming and is not achieved in one large jump.5 Instead, firms in LDCs
generally begin to improve their relative positions by entering mature industries in
which technologies are more highly codified and proprietary knowledge is no longer
closely held.6 An important role of governments in LDCs, therefore, is to help firms
to gain the range of capabilities (knowledge) that they need to function at intermediate
levels of technological sophistication, at which codified knowledge is already widely
available.
3

See the Phase 1 report, p. 82.
Lall, 2000: p 29 “Technological Change and Industrialization in the Asian Newly Industrializing
Economies: Achievements and Challenges”, in Linsu Kim and Richard R. Nelson, eds., Technology,
Learning, and Innovation: Experiences of Newly Industrializing Economies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 13-68.
5
Kim, 1997 Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press).
6
Amsden, 2001 The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies
(New York: Oxford University Press).
4
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With a few exceptions, firms in developing economies do not have the resources they
need to upgrade their process and product technologies, especially over a reasonable
period of time. In particular, SMEs (the backbone of most economies whether
developing or developed) lack both the knowledge required to make informed
decisions and the financial resources to acquire that knowledge and to invest in new
technologies once they have traced out a reasonable strategy. In countries with low
per capita incomes, governments offer the best (and perhaps also the most equitable)
prospects for concentrating the funds needed to surmount these barriers. In contrast to
private-sector firms, governments have taxation powers and an ability to provide
employment opportunities for educated people to create centralised reservoirs of
technological knowledge. These reservoirs can then be tapped by private firms
without severe and unnecessarily duplicative search costs.
Public resources are limited, and because resources are scarce, governments have an
obligation to spend money as wisely as they can – which means that they need to
establish priorities in helping private firms. From this it follows that, as private firms
need help in making informed decisions on investments in technology. Scattergun
approaches to distributing grants are wasteful because not all firms are equally worthy
of receiving funds. Therefore, governments must develop criteria (‘targets’) for
selecting the candidates that are most likely to offer substantial social returns to any
grants handed out.
A key conclusion from recent studies is that most science and technology
incentives are strongly context- (or country-) dependent. Policies and initiatives
must be geared to the scientific and technological ‘endowments’ of each country, and
to their government and business capabilities at particular points in time. Therefore
government initiatives – like financial incentives - evolve over time as national
capabilities change. Japan and Korea provide vivid examples of how S&T policies
and initiatives have evolved in this way. Before borrowing from the experience of
others in relation to specific incentives, Thailand would be well advised to analyse
carefully the particular features of the mentor country’s ‘national innovation system’
that firstly prompted the initiative, and secondly led to its success or positive impact.7

2.4

Targeting incentives: local firms

Locally-owned firms in developing economies are generally less mobile. For the most
part, they have not developed foreign operations and do not need to think in terms of
maximising returns across an international portfolio of assets. Hence, their time
horizons in regard to investments in the home economies may be substantially longer
than the time horizons of MNCs seeking low factor costs in an unstable international
climate. Any investments made in the education and training of their workforces are
therefore likely to remain within the country and be available for other uses no matter
what happens to their current employers.

7

Garrett-Jones, 2000, National Science and Technology Initiatives for ESCWA Member Countries:
Lessons from the South and East Asian Region, Commissioned paper prepared for the:Technology
Section Sectoral Issues Policy Division (SIPD) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia (UNESCWA), Beirut, Lebanon, October 2000.
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Incentives offered to locally-based firms are more effective when they involve a
mixture of generalised and targeted policies. This is because generalised grants (for
example, better provisions of educational facilities or training programs) by
themselves will not generate enough spillovers to the economy at large. Some aspects
of the need for generalised government action are uncontroversial and are common in
OECD member countries as well as in NIEs and LDCs. A well-functioning education
system that promotes basic literacy and numeracy is a sine-qua-non for economic
development and increased technological sophistication. Similarly, good provision of
tertiary education facilities, especially in technical fields, is needed to provide the
absorptive capacity that a developing economy needs.8 Subsidised training courses for
apprentices can provide accelerated assimilation of new technologies on the shop
floor. Other generalised incentives such as export facilitation schemes and tax
concessions for R&D activities are also widely-used and effective for those firms that
are already at a comparatively higher level of technological capability. .
Firms in developing economies (usually SMEs) generally lack the intellectual assets
to make informed decisions on knowledge-based inputs, and if they also lack the
resources needed to acquire those intellectual assets, then there seem to be only two
ways forward.
The first is through pure reliance on market-based mechanisms in which a few firms
succeed through their own initiative (and perhaps some good luck) in upgrading their
technological capabilities despite the barriers that they face. The mechanisms and
pathways for getting the process under way are usually not clear. Guides as to how
firms can gain the assets to finance their initial searches, learn to negotiate deals for
the licensing of technologies, whom to contact for negotiations, and so on are often
unavailable to the managers of SMEs in developing economies. In the absence of
efficient markets, the process depends on having enough capital and knowledge
(somehow) accumulated in the hands of private individuals or firms with sufficient
expertise to make informed decisions. The diffusion of such knowledge relies on the
efforts of others who (somehow) have acquired enough capital and knowledge to
enter the game as followers. Even if successful, this could be a very lengthy
procedure.
The second approach, and one which has been more successful in the globalised
environment, is to make use of the ability of national governments to concentrate
financial and human resources in order to create a pool of resources to complement
(not to replace) the resources in the hands of firms. The combined resources in the
hands of firms and governments can then be used for technological upgrading. Thus,
while private incentives for efficiency and effectiveness remain, access to requisite
start-up resources are more readily and more quickly available than through unaided
market-based mechanisms. This approach is illustrated in Exhibit 6.
The range and levels of grants open to locally-owned firms in industrially developing
economies is much greater. Not only are locally-owned companies themselves
taxpayers but, because their roots are deeper than those of MNCs, local spillovers
8

Universal provision of tertiary education is of course desirable, but a base of well-educated
technologists is also needed to take advantage of the opportunities available to developing
economies. In other cases, scarce resources could be better allocated to providing high-level
secondary training in technical fields and supporting apprenticeship and other training programs.

14

from grants are more likely and leakages and wastage are less likely. Nevertheless,
grants for pure research in countries such as Thailand are not usually offered to
locally-owned firms because, at this stage of their development, in common with
MNCs, their activities would be concentrated in mature industries. As a result, they
would be able to take advantage of foreign advances through licensing, joint ventures
or spillovers. On the other hand, for locally-owned firms, some grants can be
extremely valuable for promoting basic development activities. In order to make
eventual progress up the technological ladder,9 locally-owned firms generally move
from heavy reliance on OEM status to the establishment of independent brands, where
competitive success depends on improved process efficiencies and the development of
attractive product features that are associated with the emerging brand image.10

Exhibit 6:

The Role of Government in Supporting Flows of Knowledge and
Funding
MNCs

Government

Locally-Owned
Firms

Other
Technological
Institutions

Knowledge flows
Generalised infrastructure funding (especially education and training)
Funding for pure science
Funding for basic development activities

2.5

Targeting incentives: multinational corporations

In the case of multinational corporations, the types and amounts of government
incentives offered in developing economies are usually more limited. These firms are
9

10

Say, to follow a path similar to the one taken by the Korean semiconductor industry as described in
Kim (1997) op cit.
As has happened, for example, in the course of development of many Hong Kong firms as they
developed from OEMs to MNCs in their own right. SeeYu, (1997), Entrepreneurship and
Economic Development in Hong Kong (London: Routledge).
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assumed to produce goods, and sometimes services, at the mature end of the product
life cycle. Their operations in developing economies are usually restricted to using
known technologies to turn out standardised goods. Moreover, most MNCs already
have research establishments in developed countries, with substantial capital
investments and good access to trained scientists and engineers.
However, as the presence of MNCs can be useful in promoting technology
transfer, employment and export earnings, governments in developing economies
need to provide good public infrastructure. In the context of technological change, this
translates into making sure that the local workforce is sufficiently well-educated and
trained in order to participate efficiently in technological upgrades. Modest grants for
firm-level training can be justified for MNCs if the skills learned are largely
transferable to other uses. Small development grants can also be used to assist in
adapting the products and processes of MNCs to local needs. To qualify for funding,
an MNC would have to be deemed a ‘good citizen’, responsive to the needs of the
developing nation, as well as to meet a number of criteria including the introduction
of a technology that is both more sophisticated than the norm in the country and likely
to foster technological upgrading in other firms and industries, including suppliers of
OEM equipment.

2.6

Targeting incentives: institutional support structures

A range of institutions need to be supported to enable private firms to succeed. These
institutions include universities, trade schools, and government research institutes
(GRIs) serving particular industries. As firms operating in developing economies are
unlikely to be in the technological forefront, they, and government departments, need
access to highly trained personnel with up-to-date knowledge of international
technological trends. Otherwise, the ability of firms and departments to engage in the
next stage of technological improvement will be impaired because of a lack of
absorptive capacity. Therefore, these institutions must operate at high scientific and
technical levels to lay the basis for subsequent improvements in the private sector –
by training scientists and engineers for private and government employment who are
capable of grasping and acting on the implications of constant improvements in
technological knowledge.
For a grants system to be effective, these institutions should meet stringent criteria.
Universities, for example, should continually modernise their courses of study to meet
evolving needs. They should consult carefully with private firms and with government
research institutes when drawing up curricula so that their standards are not too
inward-looking or without reference to commercial usefulness. Similarly, the GRIs
should develop a perspective for commercial usefulness. Grants offered on a
contestable basis and cooperative basis to institutions provide a good mechanism for
maximising impact and cooperation between large and small firms and between GRIs
and private firms. Collaborative obligation helps ensure cross-fertilisation between
new technological knowledge and evolving commercial opportunities.
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2.7

International practice at the program level

Table A2 (Attachment 1) provides a series of examples of specific financial incentives
programs used in selected European, Asian and Australasian countries. The table
classifies the objectives of the incentives as follows:11
(A)

(B)

Assistance targeted at individual firms:
• strategic capabilities (awareness of the technological and business
environment);
• management of tangible technological resources (products, equipment,
design);
• management of intangible technological resources (knowledge, skills and
training);
• organisational structures and assets; and
• linkage and networking capabilities (ability to access external knowledge,
to manage user-producer relations, to form alliances with partners).
Assistance targeted at groups of firms and technology organisations:
• linkage and networking capabilities.

While the objectives themselves are fairly clear and discrete, it must be noted
immediately that many programs, if not the majority, target several or many
objectives.
While our brief is to devise more effective grant-based incentives for industrial
technology capability-building and training, we consider it vitally important to
consider the place of such incentives in the national strategy. Any selection of
incentives should consider firstly the overall national strategy that they are intended to
support, secondly the sectors and/or firms/organisations to be targeted for the
initiative, and only lastly the specific form of the incentive to be used.
In other words we believe that incentives should be chosen on the basis of their
effectiveness in meeting goals of acknowledged importance, rather than choosing the
goals to be pursued on the basis of the political attractiveness of the incentives
required to achieve them.

11

This is a slight modification of the classification scheme used in the Phase 1 report.
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3.

Review of Financial Incentives for Supporting Technology and
Skills Development in Thailand

3.1

Introduction

The observations and findings expressed in Phase 1 of the study have been reinforced
through the present review of financial incentives for industrial technology
development. That is, that a well targeted and coordinated set of financial incentives
for technology and skills enhancement are required to stimulate and assist firms to
cross the critical technology thresholds that they currently face in Thailand. It is vital
that firms make this transition in order to achieve sufficient industrial
competitiveness.
For government policy, the challenge is to achieve an appropriate portfolio of
incentives that takes account of current weaknesses in the technological capabilities of
Thai manufacturing firms, of the commercial and technology markets they operate
within, and the full range of players in the Thai innovation system.
In the light of experiences in other countries the range of incentives likely to be
required includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

generalised incentives (such as provision of basic training and technical
education for the work force);
targeted incentives (such as for acquisition of technological knowledge from
overseas or negotiating with technology suppliers);
incentives for R&D;
incentives for basic technology development (e.g. to achieve OEM
qualification or progress to own-brand products);
incentives for specific technology development (to develop or adapt specific
products for Thai-served markets);
incentives for skills development appropriate for absorbing, adapting and
generally engaging in such technology development
links between steps in the incentive system so firms can progress from
crossing basic technology thresholds to more complex thresholds; and
incentives to promote collaboration and knowledge-based cluster formation
between small and large firms and between firms and support institutions.

This chapter summarises the present status of financial incentives for stimulating
technology development in Thai firms, identifies some important gaps and provides a
framework for some revisions to the system. The final chapter outlines the revised
strategy and offers recommendations for meeting the present challenge.

3.2

Reviewing the current incentive system

In order to review the current system of incentives the project team carried out two
major exercises. The first was to review experiences in other countries and identify
some benchmarks for good and effective practice for stimulating and assisting firms
to cross technology thresholds. Major observations from this analysis were introduced
in the previous chapter. At a more micro-level the review provided some base-line
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comparisons and benchmarks for developing, administering and evaluating flexible
grant-based incentive schemes. It is against this backdrop of overseas experiences that
we carried out the second exercise - a review of the current Thai incentive system.
A set of key questions guided the review. It is important to recognise, however, that
the purpose was not to review in detail the impact, operations and effectiveness of
individual schemes but rather to review the collection of schemes as a system and the
extent to which they collectively contribute to an overall objective. That is, we were
concerned to identify strengths and weaknesses in the extent of coverage of the
schemes as a whole and the extent to which clarity and structure of schemes
contributed to the system as a whole. We were also concerned to identify gaps in their
coverage, given the current state of technology capability in Thai firms. The objective
of this analysis was to identify ways that the system as a whole might be adjusted to
improve flexibility and to respond to the critical technology thresholds currently
inhibiting international competitiveness. The analysis was based on a series of
interviews and group discussions with agencies involved with administering the
current schemes and a review of available documentation on the schemes. Exhibit 7
illustrates the approach taken by the team. Attachment 2 presents the analytical
framework that guided the interviews and discussions.
Exhibit 7:

Incentive Scheme ‘Diagnostics’
International
Benchmarking

Client and
Scheme
Performance

SCHEME
EFFECTIVENESS

Effective
Scheme
Management

Clarity of Structure
and Goals
External factors
Internal factors

The following section briefly describes the current Thai incentives system. These are
discussed below on the basis of portfolio management responsibility. While it is
necessary to discuss these schemes separately there are two points that should be
noted. Firstly, in practice, firms themselves are not concerned with such portfolio
distinctions, rather, they are simply concerned with getting on with their daily
business challenges. Indeed it is precisely these administrative distinctions that often
inhibit the success of schemes. Secondly, the distinction between schemes that
support training, design and engineering, research and development are often
immaterial to firm based technological learning. Our final analysis therefore is
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focused on identifying ways to enhance the system as a whole, rather than simply
individual schemes, or the administration of specific schemes.
While there are many good aspects of current practices, for the Thai incentives as a
whole, the diagnostics also reveal a number of shortcomings.
1. Clarity of structure and goals - There is an overlap between some schemes and
while training schemes are sometimes linked to technology development within
agencies, there are comparatively weak connection between training and
technology development offered through other agencies.
2. Effective scheme management - Monitoring and evaluation is variable across
schemes and there is rather weak systematic coordination across schemes for this
purpose. Coordination in scheme promotion and delivery is also weak.
3. International benchmarking - Given Thailand’s current state of industrial
development there is a surprisingly high emphasis on R&D compared to
enhancing basic engineering and design capabilities. These leaves significant gaps
for firms struggling to develop their capacity at lower levels of technology
threshold a critical target in the Thai industrial context.
4. Client and scheme performance - Definitions of eligibility are sometimes variable
and lead to confusion and limited uptake among smaller firms. While some
schemes are focusing on supporting groups of firms many of the schemes could be
more specifically promoting links between large and small firms.

3.3

Assessment of current schemes

Skills Development and Training
Thai companies face critical shortages of high quality engineers and in specific skills
like tool-and-die making. In Thailand, almost forty percent of manufacturing
establishments provide formal skills training to some members of their workforce,
either within the firm in in-house training programs, or in courses given by external
training providers. The incidence of in-service formal training in Thai manufacturing
appears to be as high as that in Malaysia, and higher than those in other developing
countries with lower average per capita incomes where broadly comparable training
data are available.12 However, the distribution of employer-provided formal training is
very uneven, with the incidence of training is particularly low among SMEs. Nor is
training focused on innovation. In the 2000 innovation survey, three-quarters of
medium-large companies surveyed had undertaken no innovation activities, including
relevant training.
Thailand is in the process of formulating a new Skills Development Act and
associated Fund. The new Skill Development Act makes provision for preemployment training, re-skilling on change of occupation, setting national skills
12

Hong Tan and John Middleton, Demand-Side Training in Thailand, World Bank Institute, m/s,
n.d.
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standards and accreditation, and tax relief for training organisations and firms. The
Act will also establish a restructured Skill Development Fund (SDF) to pool
government and employers’ contributions, donor funds and income, in order to
provide loans to trainees and training organisers. Employers will contribute to the
SDF only if they are unable to arrange the necessary training for themselves. The
objective is to improve both the skills of workers and of the trainers, particularly for
in-house training. However, the detail of the SDF remains to be revealed, and much
rides on its administrative implementation.
Experience in Singapore (Exhibit 9, Attachment 3) and Malaysia (Exhibit 10,
Attachment 3) and elsewhere suggests that successful SDFs share a range of
characteristics.13
•
•
•
•

•

•

They are joint endeavours between government, industry and training providers,
sustained by industry and government funding and with very strong industry
involvement in, or control of, their management.
They engage a wide range of training providers: public sector organisations, inhouse firm trainers, private trainers, and expert consultants.
They tend to provide grants to the trainee firms and loans to the training providers.
The overriding philosophy is one of ‘firms accessing their own contributions’ in
the fund.
The scope of training schemes supported by Funds is also wide ranging from basic
literacy to technical, craft, and managerial skills. On the other hand, some
component schemes are narrowly targeted towards particular types of firm,
industries or technologies.
Recognising that the training ‘industry’ itself may be weak, a crucial element is
the support for the development of training providers: through accreditation,
promulgation and application of standards, and financial assistance for training
infrastructure.
A further critical element is the support that successful SDFs provide for skills
planning and the development of training strategy within firms; and for
cooperation in training between firms, and within industries, employer groups
and geographical regions.

The Skills Development Act is a welcome step in this direction but careful
implementation will be a crucial factor if it is to produce best outcomes. Concerns
expressed at the December 2001 workshop about the new Thai SDF proposal
therefore rested on its scope and implementation, not on the legislation itself. Issues
raised at that workshop included the following.
•

13

Imposing a levy only on the firms that have no training activities might ignore
firms that had the budget but not the expertise to implement a training strategy.
The scheme must encourage learning from other firms. To maximise this, large
companies and MNCs should be involved in the scheme in some way.
Hong Tan, Do Training Levies Work? Malaysia’s HRDF and Its Effects on Training and FirmLevel Productivity, Working Paper, World Bank Institute, July 2001; A. Dar, S.; Canagarajah and
P. Murphy, Training Levies: Rationale and Evidence from Evaluations, draft m/s, Nov. 2001; S.
Garrett-Jones, Government Incentives for Technological Skills Development, paper presented to
‘Skills Development Fund Seminar’, Dept. of Skill Development, Bangkok, 19 Dec. 2001.
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•

•

The public sector and the bureaucracy should not be the sole ‘drivers’ of the SDF.
Strong employer representation including the establishment of working
committee(s) from particular industrial sectors are likely to provide a critical
success factor.
Integration of public sector training will be highly desirable (e.g. vocational and
university education) as well as substantial involvement of the private sector. The
SDF should therefore provide incentives to encourage the ‘training service
industry’ to expand its activities and to improve its quality, rather than simply
acting as an industry watchdog. In Korea, an intrusive ‘regulatory’ approach to
firm level training and eligibility skills standards had proven counterproductive
and failed to produce any increase in training activity by firms.14

Given the pending introduction of the new Skills Development Act and the need to
ensure subsequent implementation is well aligned with other financial incentives for
enhancing technology development we emphasise a number of key issues and propose
some specific recommendations in Chapter Four to achieve that.

3.3.1 Administering institutions and schemes
The range of schemes providing financial incentives directed toward enhancing
Thailand’s industrial technology capabilities is extensive. Through the course of this
study we identified 47 separate schemes. Many of these had a range of activities with
different targets and objectives covered within the scheme. Responsibility for the
administration, promotion, delivery and evaluation of these schemes is spread across
five separate portfolios of government: the Office of the Prime Minister; the Ministry
of Finance; The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment; The Ministry of
Industry and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. In addition there are a group
of schemes with independent status, such as the Office of the Thailand Research
Fund.
A summary of the schemes, the mechanisms through which they operate, their
objectives, financial commitments and industry ‘take-up’, and monitoring
mechanisms are summarised in tabular form in a matrix presented in Attachment 4. A
final column in the matrix summarises the major issues identified for schemes in
relation to the overall system of incentives. The information in the matrix was
collected through a series of interviews with senior administrators responsible for the
schemes following the ‘diagnostics’ outlined above and supplemented with relevant
documentation available to the project team.

14

Tan and Middleton, op. cit., p. 4.
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Exhibit 8 condenses this information into an illustrative map of the overall system of
schemes. Although this illustration does not take into account the varying size of
different schemes, their financial commitments or the numbers of firms assisted it
does serve to reveal some overall key features of the system.
First, the map illustrates the complexity of the schemes. There are five separate
ministerial portfolios involved and across these are similar types of schemes offered
with similar objectives, different reporting requirements, eligibility criteria and
implementation time-lines.
Secondly, while international experience identifies the value in having a range of
schemes in place to respond to different needs of firms at different stages of
technological development the current map illustrates a high degree of fragmentation.
International benchmarks of successful incentives regimes reflect more integration
and coordination between schemes with similar objectives, targets and mechanisms.
This complexity and fragmentation leads to two major problems. The first concerns
the effective promotion of schemes. Potential user firms are unlikely to fully benefit
from the system as a whole unless they are clearly aware of the goals and the relative
benefits for their specific needs. Planning for technology development requires a
reasonably informed scan of the options available. The present structure of schemes
implies the need for an extensive commitment to coordinated of promotion and
delivery.
The second problem concerns the need for flexibility to enable firms to move between
schemes. International benchmarks show that effective client and scheme
performance rests very much on their capacity to stimulate technology learning in
firms to enable them to make appropriate technology development choices. This
implies that it is not so much the number of schemes that are available but the
accessibility of schemes to firms at times that match their specific and immediate
needs.
These overall issues associated with effective scheme management, their clarity of
structure and goals and their performance are addressed with some specific
recommendation in Chapter 4. The following section briefly discusses the individual
schemes in the context of these overarching issues. More detailed summaries of the
schemes are presented in Attachment 4 and in the matrix included in that same
attachment.

3.3.2

Schemes administered through the Office of the Prime Minister - Board of
Investment (BOI)

Administration:
The Board of Investment provides a range of mechanisms for encouraging Thai firms
to engage in R&D activities. The BOI definition of R&D is quite broad and includes
basic, applied and experimental development in the guiding definition.
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Goals:
The mechanisms target two categories of firms: those who carry out R&D as separate
activities from their regular business and those firms who carry out R&D on behalf of
other firms. Support is targeted toward firms located in priority investment zones.
Impact:
According to respondents, private investors are generally not enthusiastic about the
R&D promotion measures. Among the reasons offered to explain the lack of such
enthusiasm are:
•
•
•
•

a lack of qualified researchers and engineers to conduct R&D in Thailand The
approval process is cumbersome and requires many steps;
concern among some potential applicants that because the BOI definition of R&D
is quite broad the judgment is to whether an application will be successful will fall
to an individual official;
different incentives for R&D activities, depending on the zone, presents confusion
between different objectives: that of R&D activities and that of regional
distribution;
other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia offer more attractive incentives
for firms to invest in R&D including customized incentives such as grants or land.

By international standards, the monitoring and evaluation system is comparatively
limited. BOI officers usually monitor the scheme once or twice through project
approval and project expansion approval processes. Annual monitoring is provided
through submission of balance sheets to BOI.
BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD)
Administration:
The Bureau of Investment administers the Unit for Industrial Linkage Development
(BUILD). The objectives of BUILD are to:
•
•
•
•

stimulate more consumption of local parts and components
provide chances for the parts manufacturers to enter new assembly markets
help the parts manufacturers understand related businesses
encourage more investment in parts and components manufacturing in Thailand

In practice the ‘Vendors Meets Clients’ (VMC) program within BUILD is the only
scheme with a specific focus on technology development or transfer.
Goals:
VMC seeks to match vendors/manufacturers with customers/assemblers. The program
involves taking parts manufacturers to visit assembly plants. This linkage opportunity
assists the manufacturers to initiate business deals to supply parts and components for
the plants. As a result, the parts manufacturers learn what the assemblers want, while
the assemblers learn more about the firms who can supply the parts they require.
Impact:
So far, 1,000 Thai companies have joined the programme and participated in a total of
42 visits to large manufacturers. Although this program is not strictly speaking a
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scheme that offers financial incentive for technology development it is noted here
because the activity has the potential to stimulate initial demand and offer information
which might lead to involvement in other schemes.
3.3.3

Ministry of Finance - Department of Revenue

Depreciation allowances for machinery and equipment
Administration
The Department of Revenue delivers schemes to encourage private sector investment
in R&D. These schemes include tax concessions on the depreciation of machinery and
equipment used for R&D. There is no specific monitoring system in place although
the general taxation provisions allow for accountability.
Goals
The objective of these schemes is to deliver taxation relief to encourage firms to direct
machinery and equipment specifically toward R&D activities.
Impact
One major problem in taking advantage of this provision is the definition of R&D
machinery and equipment. Firms are uncertain whether their machinery and
equipment will fit the understanding of the Revenue Department whose officials are
expected to come and their premise. For example, one firm reported that it had filed
for such provision 3 years ago and had not yet received an edict on the matter.
200% Tax Concession for R&D Expenditure
Administration:
Under this measure, firms can apply for a 200 percent deduction of their R&D
expenditure from their taxable income. However, firms’ R&D projects and agencies
must be certified by NSTDA to qualify for relief under the scheme. Follow-up project
evaluation is carried out by NSTDA.
Goals:
The objective of the scheme is to encourage firms to engage contract research
agencies to carry out R&D on their behalf and to encourage firm-based R&D where
in-house capability can be demonstrated. There is a condition that the firms or
organisations contracted to carry out the R&D must be included in a list of agencies
approved by MOF and NSTDA. This latter feature of the scheme is different from the
practice in other countries where firms incurring their own R&D expenses are
automatically eligible for a tax concession. Approved agencies include subordinate
research units or spin-off firms of a conglomerate; independent research units or
companies; universities, labs and government research organizations.
Impact:
By the end of 2000, tax deductions had been granted to 36 firms/organisations. Most
of companies benefiting from the tax concession are subordinate research units or
companies. Only a very small number of independent companies or research units
receive the R&D tax concession.
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According to respondents factors contributing to lack of firms taking advantage of the
tax concession include:
• the approval process is cumbersome and takes considerable time;
• lack of clarity in definitions - according to some firms, the definition of R&D
activities is not clear and they are not certain what kind of expenditure will
actually qualify for the deduction;
• design and engineering activities, essential for many firms in developing their
R&D potential are not included in the Revenue Department 's definition of R&D;
• the requirement that only R&D expenditures paid to the listed organisations in the
MOF announcement are eligible for tax concession does not encourage firms to
carry out R&D within their own firms - some firms have overcome this separating
out their R&D section from the parent company and applying for their R&D
section to be listed.
Deduction/exemption of R&D machinery import duties.
Administration:
The Customs Department provides for deduction/exemption from import duties for
R&D machinery and equipment.
Goals:
The objective of this scheme is to promote R&D by reducing the import cost in
acquiring machinery or equipment necessary for R&D. Import duty relief covers:
scientific tools; R&D chemicals; environmentally sound machinery; computer and
electronics parts; training and testing equipment.
Impact:
Comments received through the present study indicate that the approval process for
deductions takes considerable time.
150% tax concession for training expenditure
Administration:
The Revenue Department also provides a 150 percent tax concession for expenditure
on employee training with the Department of Skill Development for in-house training
approved by the department.
Goals:
The tax concession is designed to generally encourage more spending on training
courses by the private sector rather than to specifically enhance technological and
production capabilities. In its present form the scheme provides generalised training
support. Although generalised skills development is a critical activity for countries
such as Thailand there is a need to specifically targeted training toward enhancing
skills for undertaking technological activities such as design and engineering and
quality management.
Impact:
The agency reported that involvement in the program has been declining over the past
three years, in terms of the number of firms involved, the number of courses offered
and the number of training participants.
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3.3.4 Independent agencies
Thailand Research Fund - R&D Grants (TRF)
Administration:
The Thailand Research Fund was established as an independent agency with the
mandate to provide research grants to the private sector. TRF coordinators, mostly
recruited from universities, assist in identifying appropriate firms and in preparing
applications for grants. A small team of experts is appointed to assess the proposal
and monitor its progress if it is successful. Because of the ‘selective’ project
development process most applications are successful. TRF coordinators manage the
scheme and monitor progress through six month visits. A project planning tool for
project and overall schemes evaluation. Administration of the programme is
maintained within 10 percent of total annual expenditure.
Objectives:
Two programmes are offered to support R&D activities for production processes and
product development by allocating grants to SMEs. Grants up to the value of Baht
50,000 are available to firms who must match the grant by contributing to at least 50
percent of the total project cost. Activities must be carried out in collaboration with
public sector researchers. The support is targeted to industry sub-sectors identified by
government as a high priority. The fund has recently introduced a programme to build
closer links between university training programmes and industry.

Impact:
TRF currently administers 153 projects and has delivered Baht 100 million to firms
over the past eight years. Delivery of grants to the private sector is currently limited
by: a) the 50 percent matching requirement; b) matching grants do not qualify for
relief through the 200 percent tax concession scheme, unless they are carried out in
one of the approved agency or firms; c) limited awareness of the scheme and
identifying firms with the appropriate capacity to carry out projects.

3.3.5

Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment

Revolving Fund for Technological Research and Development (RTDRF)
Administration:
The Research and Technology Development Revolving Fund provides two
programmes of financial support in the form of soft loans.
Goals:
The objective of the loans is to reduce financial risk and stimulate investment in the
commercialisation of R&D results. Two programs have different targets. One
provides soft loans for amounts up to 10 million baht targeted for technological R&D.
These attract an interest rate of four percent per year with maturity required within
eight years. A second program provides larger amounts for process improvement and
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commercialisation, up to 20 million baht per project. These attract an interest rate of
six percent per year and maturity is required within 10 years.
Impact:
The Fund has not attracted much enthusiasm from the private sector. Since 1988, 47
projects from SMEs have been supported with a combined value of 455.088 million
baht. Reasons identified for limited impact include the following:
1) the approval process takes more than one year to complete;
2) there is limited awareness of these scheme as it is is not strongly promoted;
3) there is shortage of personnel directly responsible for fund management;
4) the available funds, conditions and interest rate are not sufficiently attractive;
5) there are other similar funds available such as through NSTDA;
6) many firms find the reporting and evaluation process too burdensome;
7) SMEs have difficulty meeting the collateral needed while larger firms find the
amount of loan available to be too small.
Innovation Development Fund
Administration:
The IDF is a new programme established in 1998 as part of a package to stimulate
innovation and increase the competitiveness of Thai firms. It is currently under the
administration of NSTDA. The fund provides the private sector with financial support
(grants, soft loans) and technical and business advisory service through Business
Innovation Projects, Business Start-up Projects, and Strategic Projects.
An office oversees the management of the Fund and an Executive Committee carries
responsibility for the functioning of the Office. NSTDA, the Ministry of Finance and
NESDB provide the legal framework within which IDF is established. Financial
support is available through a program of grants and loans. The IDF mandate also
allows it to make investments in selected projects. In addition IDF can provide
technical support for project or process development and for financial and business
activities. Monitoring is carried out through established performance measures,
however, because the program is still in a development phase full program evaluation
has not yet occurred.
Goals:
There are four key objectives in IDF’s approach:
• to establish an operational system to provide definitions of ‘innovation projects’;
• to promote awareness and appreciation of the benefits derived from innovation;
• to develop strategic projects with the potential to have major impact on specific
sectors; and
• to work with potential innovators to develop innovation project proposals.
Project support is targeted toward projects that qualify as having a clear ‘innovation
action’ such as the introduction of a new product, new service or process as well as
new ways of supporting and servicing products or processes. Projects must also
demonstrate technical and business feasibility. One of the roles of the fund is to assist
firms to develop proposals to the stage where such feasibility can be demonstrated.
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Impact:
The program is still in early stages of development. In the first year of its operations
(2000) 62 proposals were received ‘in various stages of development’. In 2001 IDF
staff were engaged with the development of 26 projects. Although the IDF was
intended to provide a driving force for large and extensive innovation projects
involving groups or clusters of firms, its operations to date have been comparatively
modest. However, more recently the program has been expanded and given a higher
priority by the Government. By mid 2002, 109 firms had applications registered for
support.
The majority of funds are allocated toward ‘upgrading innovation’ (1,180 million
Baht - 83 percent of funds); ‘building an innovation culture’ is allocated 105 million
Baht (7.4 percent) and ‘building innovation organisations’ is allocated 135 million
Baht (9.5 percent). Administration takes up approximately 9.5 percent of funds.
During its first year of activities the Chairman noted a number of features that would
require attention in future development of the scheme. These included:
• a need to be more proactive in seeking out new projects and provide assistance in
developing proposals;
• a need to provide an appropriate match of technical and financial support;
• a need to establish a database of technical and business experts to assist in project
assessment; and
• a need to enhance networking and cluster formation between organisations
engaged in related activities.
NSTDA - Department of Industrial and Business Development
Administration:
NSTDA is responsible for the Department of Industrial and Business Development.
Interested companies can apply to participate in the program. NSTDA’s Industrial
Technology Advisors (ITA) will visit firms to assess firms’ needs and identify skills
and information lacking in firms (e.g. good quality management system, business
plan, or marketing). The ITA then presents a draft project proposal to assist firms
develop a capacity to innovate. Once the project has been approved, the ITAs recruit
qualified consultants to provide assistance to the firm. The level of grant varies by
scheme.
Goals:
The overall objective is to support and stimulate the private sector to adapt
technology, promote R&D and innovation for new products and processes in the
manufacturing sector.
MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC
NSTDA is also responsible for MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC that provide
technology services, and grants directed toward projects within universities and the
private sector. One of the issues associate with these latter schemes is that there is
some overlap with similar schemes offered through TRF and more recently IDF.
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Standard Testing and Quality Control (STQC ) and Thai Foundation Quality System
(TFQS):
Administration:
These two programs are quality management programs. The schemes are monitored
by an auditor. As a precautionary measure applicants have to place a deposit with
NSTDA at the beginning of the program to guarantee they will devote time to make
the activities successful.
Goals:
TFQS provides a beginning standard of quality management, created by NSTDA
staff, which is lower than ISO. The scheme is targeted toward firms requiring
certification for ISO, GMP or TQM. Firms who are not ready for ISO will be advised
to apply for TFQS at the beginning. NSTDA will grant 50 percent of support required
under the TFQS scheme but to a maximum of Baht 30,000. Financial support for
STQC is not provided.
The Company Directed Technology Development Programme (CD)
Administration:
The CD programme was established within NSTDA to provide grants and soft loans
to enable SMEs to invest in R&D for commercialization. Monitoring is carried out
every six months by ITAs with assistance from other experts
Goals:
Funds are targeted toward building or improving laboratory facilities, upgrading
technology, or new product development. Soft loans are available for the development
of new production processes or new products, building or improving laboratory
facilities, upgrading technology, or utilisation of scientific and technological R&D
capabilities existing within private and government laboratories. The maximum
amount of loan available is 20 million baht but the amount must not be more than 50
percent of the total cost of the project. Interest rate is currently half that offered by the
banks, but includes an overhead fee. Grants have now been removed from the scheme
because these are available through other agencies - TRF, IDF, MTEC, BIOTEC and
NECTEC.
Impact:
Apart from the limited amount of fund available per project the condition that the firm
has to finance at least half of the project presents a formidable hurdle for many firms.
Another major difficulty with soft loans is the condition that the financial institution
has to guarantee the principal payment. Financial institutions are not very active in
lending out R&D soft loans because of this additional risk. Between 1992 and 2001
the scheme provided support for 89 projects involving 77 firms.
Industrial Technology Assistance Programme (ITAP)
ITAP, previously known as the Consultancy Services introduces experts (freelance or
retired university professors) to firms to provide advice on technology and product
development. The scheme also offers project evaluation service and financial support
for up to 50 percent of the total cost of expenses. Evaluation is carried out during the
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beginning of the project with interim monitoring that incorporates comments from
experts and firms. When the project is finished, firms must submit a report to
NSTDA.
Goals:
ITAP has the objective of enhancing the capability for production technology of
SMEs by supporting Thai industry to use technical consultants.
Impact:
ITAP has supported 217 projects involving 184 firms.
Support for Technology Acquisition and Mastery Programme (STAMP)
Administration:
STAMP provides financial support and arrangements for factory visit abroad for key
staff within SMEs. Participating firms have to prepare and deliver a presentation to
the host firms. Evaluation is carried out independently by the University of the Thai
Chamber of Commerce.
Goals:
The objective is to assist firms discover new technology. Inbound and outbound
missions are organized to introduce technology to firms. The scheme provides
financial support for air fares.
Impact:
The emphasis on travel introduces a controversial issue that STAMP is predominantly
a ‘fun trip’ rather than for serious technology development. STAMP has provided
support for 227 firms. Evaluations carried out by the University of the Thai Chamber
of Commerce have been positive.
Intellectual Property Services (IPS)
NSTDA, through the IPS, provides legal advice and service in intellectual property
rights protection. The Intellectual Property institute at Chulalongkorn University
provides registration service and organizes seminars related to intellectual property.
IPS has provided support for 37 projects involving 35 firms.
NSTDA Investment Centre (NIC)
NIC supports the development of joint ventures with the private sector to invest in
technology identified as ‘vital to the country’ e.g. ISP, Distance Training, GMO
analysis. The proportion of investment from NSTDA varies case by case but can not
be more than 49 percent of the overall activity.
Summary Issues for the NSTDA schemes
Goals:
NSTDA primarily targets its schemes toward support for SMEs estimated to be
around 80,000 firms. The client base has grown over the past five years. Demand
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continues to increase but the availability of funds does not appear to be sufficient to
meet the growing demand.
Impact:
The budget is allocated scheme by scheme, which does not currently allow for funds
to be transferred from one scheme to another. Recovery of loan funds has remained at
100 percent. In the process of project selection, ITAs play an important role in
selecting, analyzing and devising the project. Critical question that ITAs are asked to
answer concern whether the projects are in line with strategies (to promote firms
bringing technology for R&D and innovation).
NSTDA promotes its schemes through direct mail, exhibition participation, seminars
and training. In 2002, NSTDA began utilising a PR company to promote the schemes
through newspaper (publishing a ‘scoop of success stories’), TV and radio.
The Thai Institute of Scientific and Technological Research
The Thai Institute of Scientific and Technological Research provides laboratory
services, research and development services and technology transfer services. These
services are available to the private sector on a fee for service basis.

3.3.6 Ministry of Industry
The Thailand Productivity Institute
The Thailand Productivity Institute provides public and in-house training. The
objective is to enhance human resource development for productivity improvement.
The cost for delivery of training is subsidised.
The National Food Institute
The National Food Institute provides training and laboratory services for supporting
firms in that sector.
The Thai Automotive Institute
The Thai Automotive Institute has a scheme for supporting supplier development
directed primarily toward SMEs. The scheme provides funding for group consulting
to the value of 200,000 baht per factory. Support for individual firm consulting is also
available which supports 75 percent of the cost with a Baht 200,000 ceiling.
The Electrical and Electronics Institute
The Electrical and Electronics Institute provides product testing and calibration
services and training services for firms in this sector.
The National Institute of Metrology
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The National Institute of Metrology provides technical assistance and measurement
testing services.
The Thai-German Institute
Administration:
The Thai-German Institute was established with a ten year grant from the Thai
government. The government also supports individual training projects. The ThaiGerman Institute provides in-kind support through the provision of experts,
machinery and training. TGI promotes their program through their own marketing
staff and carries out routine customer satisfaction surveys. These surveys evaluate
content of the modules, equipment and machinery, trainers and TGI management.
TGI also monitors its operations by creating efficiency indicators such as monthly
operation efficiency and customer satisfaction and sales per staff or per true delivery
or per supporting staff. In addition the institute is monitored and evaluated by external
agencies - usually every two years.
Goals:
The main objective of the TGI activities are to train technicians in advanced
manufacturing technology and to provide industrial consultancy services for firms.
Impact:
The demand for TGI service has increased in CAD-CAM and computerization related
courses. However, TGI staff report they are not certain whether some of the other
technical training offered suits the changing demand of their Thai clients. Main
constraints identified for the program include:
1. the relevance and level of knowledge/ technology of trainees
2. ability of employees to gain leave to attend the training;
3. a high training cost due to TGI’s high operation cost (approximately 70
percent and up to 90 percent when including depreciation cost).
Department of Industrial Promotion (DIP)
Administration:
The Department of Industrial Promotion has various schemes providing grants to
firms in hiring consultants to improve firms’ productivity. These schemes include:
Project 13; Consultancy Fund (CF), ITB and MDIC.
DIP - Project 13 Goals:
Project 13 starts every fiscal year. Interested firms have to submit their application to
participate in the program during certain period of time. The total number of
applications submitted to Project 13 is 400 firms. Those 400 firms will be allocated to
institutes sub-contracting consultancy work from the Ministry, mainly university
professors that are interested to become consultants of the program. The consultancy
is carried as group work, not individually. The period of the project is strictly limited
to 6 months. The government fully covers the consultancy fees.
DIP - Consultancy Fund Administration:
Project development starts with the diagnosis of problems and needs of clients by
experienced DIP officers. Then, a TOR will be drafted and a bidding process is put in
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place to appoint consultants. Grant are available for up to 20% of the total budget
value but to a maximum value of 200,000 baht.
Evaluation is provided through a requirement that consultant teams submit a progress
report every quarter to the approval committee. The approval committee also visits
firms participating in the project to identify any problems. When the project finishes,
an approval committee, consisting of one DIP official and one expert assess whether
the consultant has delivered the work according to the TOR.
DIP - Consultancy Fund Goals
The Consultancy Fund (CF) was established in 2000 to provide consultancy services
to SMEs. The programme provides financial support of up to 50 percent of consultant
fee but to a maximum value of 200,000 baht. There are eleven regional Industrial
Promotion Centers involved with delivering the program.
DIP - Consultancy Fund Impact:
Between 1996-1999 there was a total budget of Baht 45.5 million. However, only
Baht 5.2 million (11.43 percent) was granted to 48 firms. The majority of services
(90 percent) were related to management rather than technology - mainly consultancy
for ISO 9000, QC or TQM.
CF’s target is approximately 100 factories per year, with 40 firms in central area and
60 firms in the regions. Criteria for firms to be eligible for the program is that they
should be SME in the manufacturing sector with more than 50 percent of Thai
shareholders. The trend of demand is increasing slowly. There is some overlap with
the ITB.
Annual budget for CF is 15.5 million baht. However in 2000, 5.2 million baht was
granted to the private sector (33.7 percent of the budget allocated). This increased to
7.65 million baht (49.4 percent of the budget allocated) in 2001. Administration cost
is 10.5 percent of the total budget allocated.
DIP - Invigorating Thai Business (ITB)
The Invigorating Thai Business Program offers grants directed toward SMEs to assist
them solve technical and management problems. Grants are provided to cover expert
fees. The scheme is similar to the CF program.
DIP - Management Development Program (MDIC)
There are five components to the MDIC program. Modernisation of production;
technology management planning and acquisition of technology; strategic planning;
financial management; and marketing. The program provides up to 170 person days
of consultancy. Firms must pay one third of the cost out of a maximum of 900,000
baht. To be eligible for support under the program firms must participate in all five
components.
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DIP - Training Fund
The DIP Training Fund provides grants up to the value of 150,000 baht to cover 50
percent of training costs to eligible SMEs.

DIP - Productivity Improvement Loan
The Ministry of Industry, with support from BOT, has financial assistance in the form
of soft loans through IFCT and EXIM Bank. The soft loans are for the purpose of
improving firms’ productivity and machinery. The soft loan interest rate is 1 percent
with maturity period of five to seven years. The total amount loaned must not exceed
200 million baht.

3.3.7 Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
Department of Skill Development - Skills Development Fund
Administration:
This fund seeks to promote training for both skilled and non-skilled workers. The
fund provides soft loans for trainees at 1 percent interest rate. Funds are available to
cover expenses incurred for personnel and associated expenses.
A new draft Skill Development Act is currently before parliament. The proposed new
Act will allow for the transfer of funds from the previous Skill Development Fund. It
will essentially operate through levying an amount of up to 1 percent of payroll on
firms that do not carry out adequate training as determined by the Ministry of Labour.
The Act will therefore act as an incentive to encourage firms to provide training by
penalising them if they do not do so.
Goals:
The training schemes will engage large firms and SMEs in collaborative training
approaches, draw together industry and public sector involvement and engage a wide
range of training providers. They are also intended to support a wide range of
schemes, from basic literacy to technical, craft and managerial skills. Some will be
targeted toward particular sectors and technologies and some will be targeted toward
accreditation of training providers.
Potential impact:
The draft Act is not specific on how these features will be incorporated in practical
delivery of training. Given the importance of delivering appropriate training to ensure
industrial technology development in Thailand can proceed we offer some specific
recommendations for the implementation of programs under the new Act in the
concluding chapter of this report.
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3.4

Weaknesses and limitations in the present framework

There is a wide range of incentives for technology development in place in Thailand.
However, the current range of incentive schemes described above reflect a policy
perspective that has not kept pace with the demands of global environments.
International experiences reflect the need to target incentives where they will have
maximum impact. This implies targeting particular types or groups of firms and
targeting the specific technology thresholds relevant to their current levels of
technology capabilities.
Some general areas of weakness can be observed from the above overview and the
summary of schemes provided in Attachment 4.
The main elements of these weaknesses are summarised below.
• Current R&D incentives are inhibited by eligibility criteria that supports the ‘top
end’ of firm technology capabilities but leaves gaps for firms struggling to
develop their capacity at lower technology thresholds. This ‘gap’ in the current
incentives regime is illustrated in Exhibit 9.
• Given Thailand’s current state of industrial development there is a surprisingly
high emphasis on supporting R&D compared to the attention given to enhancing
basic engineering and design capabilities.
• Those schemes that do address this level of technology development are faced
with increasing demands for support from firms but have insufficient resources
and budget flexibility to adequately meet such demands.
• While some schemes provide matching grants for research and development the
private sector contributions are often excluded from attracting R&D tax
concessions.
• There is an overlap between some schemes which can lead to confusion among
firms that are targeted by such schemes.
• Schemes that address training are sometimes linked to technology development
schemes delivered by the same agencies but there is far less connection between
training schemes with technology development (or training) offered through other
agencies.
• At a general level the grants and loans schemes are either too small to provide
sufficient incentive to large firms and the matching fund requirements too
stringent for small firms.
• There is some rigidity in the system that does not allow for firms to progress
through ‘incremental steps in developing their technology capabilities.
• There remains a strong focus on supply driven incentives compared to incentives
that stimulate demand for technology upgrading.
• There is an apparent recognition of the need to support groups of firms and in
particular links between large and small firms, but the many of the schemes could
be more specifically and aggressively turned toward this objective.
• Monitoring and evaluation is variable across schemes15 and there is rather weak
systematic coordination across schemes for this purpose.
• Cooperation and coordination in scheme promotion and delivery is also weak.
15

However, new budget procedures are likely to introduce much more stringent requirements on
the monitoring and evaluation of public sector expenditures.
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3.5

The Challenge for Thailand

Far from retreating from public investment in technology development and training,
the challenge for Thailand is to find efficient and locally acceptable means of
underwriting technology development and learning within private firms. Solutions
will require support for collaborative strategies among the whole range of ‘knowledge
system’ players as well as for firm-based activity. Success will deliver public benefits
to the country: benefits measured in terms of skills and experience in technology, as
well as monetary return. Failure to come to terms with the necessity of developing
functioning ‘knowledge networks’ will see Thailand fall further behind economies
such as Singapore and Taiwan in terms of national industrial technology capability
and skills, and in its ability to compete on the basis of ‘knowledge’ rather than on
other factors of production.

Exhibit 9:

Locating the Gap in the Current Incentives System
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A further challenge will be to devise ways to use appropriate financial support
mechanisms, including grants to private companies where these are warranted.
Contestability (competition) and transparency of funding are essential. Support
schemes must be complementary and well coordinated and delivered and well
understood by firm managers. Options such as ‘one stop shops’ and contracting the
private sector to deliver the schemes have been canvassed through the present project,
and specific proposals for rationalisation and coordination of government support are
outlined below.
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3.6

Developing a revised framework

We see three key propositions or ‘strategies’ that together provide a framework for
revising and improving the effectiveness of present system of financial incentives.
Proposition 1: Government financial incentives should support the full range of
technology capability building activities within the firm in an integrated manner.
This proposition recognises that Thai government financial incentives for technology
capability building and training are not currently as comprehensive or as effective as
firms require. Firms’ technological capabilities comprise three interlocking sets of
competencies (skills, technical knowledge and organisation): production capability
(management and engineering), project execution (feasibility, training, execution) and
innovation capability (new product development, R&D). Effective incentive schemes
should therefore support the full range of these activities and integrate these activities
in a way that takes account of how firms operate.
A notable gap in current incentives lies in the area of networking and cooperation,
between firms both around technology development and in relation to training. Some
incentives should specifically encourage cooperation in technology development and
training between firms (including between local and between local and foreign
firms), and between firms and public sector institutions such as universities.
Well-targeted and comprehensive incentives will be ineffective if hampered by poor
definition of eligibility (in activities or clients), inadequate resources, and poor
administration and delivery. We consider that the management of current incentive
schemes need to be more integrated in terms of activities supported, and more
aggressively delivered to firms. This does not necessarily require consolidating all
existing schemes under one or two government agencies, but it does require
consolidating their promotion, monitoring and evaluation.
Proposition 2: Incentives must be targeted at those industry sectors, firms and
activities that are likely to provide the greatest public benefit.
At a strategic level, the Thai government should develop criteria (‘targets’) for
selecting the candidate industry sectors, firms and activities that are most likely to
offer substantial social returns to any grants handed out. A critical factor in delivering
maximum impact will be to target technology thresholds (irrespective of sector) that
are creating the greatest bottlenecks for technology upgrading. In the case of
Thailand the evidence is that this is not at the level where firms are already engaged
with R&D, but at the level where firms need to build their capacity for design and
engineering capabilities. This observation was emphasised in Phase 1 of this study. It
is further reinforced in this Phase of the study. The strength of demand for financial
assistance sought by firms for developing these capabilities is considerably more than
the level of take-up of incentives for schemes that predominantly designed to promote
R&D would suggest.
The criteria for targeting should emphasise development where target sectors, target
firms and target activities intersect and where firms themselves have already made
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progress toward enhancing technology capability. Criteria for achieving this is
elaborated further below.
Targeting industry sectors:
Key sectors are those where levels of technology are higher than those currently
common in Thai industry but not at the cutting edge. This would permit: (a)
technology upgrading when Thailand enters the sector but at a level that can be
accommodated with achievable (if still substantial) investments in further training; (b)
ready access to technical knowledge that is already codified or potentially available
through learning and know-how gained through closer interaction with other firms;
(c) an ability to upgrade technology capabilities for process engineering and limited
R&D development (localisation of the product); and, (d) allow limited engagement
with basic research where it can serve to embed firms in research and development
processes and link them to innovative clusters.
There should be an emphasis on sectors where there are substantial existing markets
are clearly identified niche markets, preferably both international and domestic, to
permit increased exports and import substitution. But essentially where there is
limited competition from firms in other developing nations to avoid potential glutting
of the market. There should also be an emphasis given to sectors where there is a
comparative advantage in non-technological factors of production, such as geographic
location, opportunities for tourism and cultural factors.
Where possible, areas to target should be in those sectors where there is a
demonstrated willingness on the part of existing MNCs to operate in Thailand and
give business to Thai suppliers at segments of their supply chains that would allow
local firms to engage in initial technological upgrading and lay the foundations for
further upgrading in the future.
In general, these criteria imply moving into mature industries at positions in their
supply chains that do not rely simply on low factor costs – e.g. of labour and raw
materials – but also provide entrees to technological sophistication beyond those
currently prevailing in Thailand.
Targeting firms.
Local SMEs are a clearly a first priority for support. It is appropriate to fund
activities in SMEs that would not be supported in larger, more technology-capable
companies. There is strong argument for a new scheme that is far more accessible to
SMEs. There is also a place for incentives (but not necessarily grants) targeted at
multinational corporations, to encourage them to assist local companies in
technology development and training.
For local firms criteria for eligibility requirements to receive incentives should be
based on: (a) the introduction of updated (but not cutting-edge) technologies; (b)
operating in industries with good commercial prospects; (c) demonstrated commercial
probity of owners and managers with an outward focused approach to innovation and
marketing; (d) sufficient initial technical capabilities within firm to support
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upgrading; and (e) potential for transferring knowledge and skills to other firms and
industries.
For MNCs, eligibility requirements should be based on: (a) those MNC who introduce
more sophisticated (although probably not cutting-edge) technologies than are
currently in general use; (b) where these technologies offer good prospects for
diffusion to other industries (act as leading sectors), thereby spreading technological
upgrading; (c) “good citizenship” in the sense of a high probability that firms
receiving incentives will adhere to local laws and regulations.
Targeting ‘activities’:
The criteria for targeting types of activities should emphasise: a) those types of
incentives that they require levels of technological skill above those currently
common in Thailand; b) those that can be taught locally (and to local workers) at a
reasonable cost and in a reasonable span of time; those that are flexible and
potentially applicable to a variety of firms and industrial sectors. This should allow
for the promotion of potential indigenous entrepreneurship by those who are trained
and wish to go into business independently, and serve to avoid workers becoming so
highly specialised that the value of their skills is destroyed if their initial employer
fails for some reason.
Phase One of the present study, identified the need to target technology thresholds in
Thai firms toward stimulating demand and building capacity in firms for raising
design and engineering capabilities. However, within this overall national objective
the nature of critical technology thresholds for firms in Thailand will vary in different
sectors. It will therefore be necessary to investigate priority industry clusters very
carefully to ensure that financial incentive scheme activities are designed, promoted,
and delivered at targets most likely to maximise benefit from the investment. This is
discussed further in the concluding chapter of this report.
In addition and complementary to the above, training and formal skill development
are clearly first priority activities for incentive support. This includes support to assist
firms in formulating their technology and training strategies. However, training
support should be targeted toward those same technology thresholds addressed by
other schemes. A key to achieving this is to provide flexibility for firms to sort out
this matching process themselves. In short, this implies building on the efforts
already underway within the private sector. This challenge is taken up with some
specific recommendations below.
The point of these criteria is that maximum impact and efficiency of the incentive
system is most likely to be realised when the schemes target the intersection between
key sectors, firms and activities. This is illustrated in Exhibit 10.

Proposition 3: The choice of particular form of incentive (tax incentive, loan,
grant) is a tactical decision that must take account of local circumstances.
We consider that the particular form of financial incentive provided to companies is
not in itself a critical factor in the effectiveness of the incentive. However, in the Thai
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context, providing grants to companies would overcome some of the problems that
firms have with raising collateral, with the definition and administration of tax
incentives, and with cash flow problems.

Exhibit 10:

A Framework for Identifying Targets for Incentives
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We note that most industrialising countries have a portfolio of incentives that include
grants to private companies. Like other financial incentives, these grants are justified
where the activity is particularly high risk (long-term R&D), where there are
substantial spillovers from the firm (eg. of knowledge or trained people), or where a
firm is too small to resource the activity on its own.
We therefore consider that there is strong argument for delivering financial assistance
to SMEs in the form of grants, ‘vouchers’ or ‘innovation credits’, or by other means
that do not require large ‘up front’ payments by the firm.
Obviously, the process for targeting, awarding and administering grants must be a fair
one. Contestability (competition) for funds and transparency of funding guidelines
and administration are essential. To reduce the risk of funds being misapplied,
agencies must be able and sufficiently resourced to allow them to assess that firms are
both sufficiently competent and honest.
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4.

A Revised System of Incentives for Enhancing Technological
Capability in Thai firms

The analysis of the present incentive systems and mechanisms for skill development
and technological upgrading leads to a number of key recommendations. These are
presented below under five key headings. The final section (4.6) sets out a plan for
action by key agencies to implement these recommendations.
4.1

Revising financial incentives for skills development and training

A first issue for maximising the impact of incentives for skills and development
concerns changing the behaviour of firms towards training. The existing tax deduction
for training, ‘typically subsidises the types and volumes of training that would
probably have been undertaken in any case.’16 Exempting firms on the basis of their
existing training activities (with no other assistance from the SDF) would provide
even less leverage on firms. It would not seem to give the SDF the opportunity to
improve the level or quality of training within these firms.
Large firms in particular carry out a disproportional share of training and are also in a
position to assist SMEs that they have commercial relations with. However, they fall
largely outside the purview of the proposed SDF. The potential for the diffusion of
knowledge for technology development to smaller firms will be enhanced if larger
firms are part of training networks.
Recommendation 1:
Large firms should be encouraged to become actively involved in training. This
could be achieved through their representation on the SDF Board and through
their involvement in collaborative training arrangements. For example the new
Skills Development Fund could target specific incentives for in-house training by
MNCs for staff of other companies to allow them to act as training suppliers for
their industry.
In the Singapore case, noted in Exhibit 11, partnerships were established with MNCs
to create industry specific training centres. This approach could be adopted by the
SDF as a mechanism to enhance the diffusion of skills from large (including foreign)
to smaller firms.
A second issue concerns establishing an effective way to reach smaller firms.
Evidence from the Malaysian HRDF suggests that the scheme has worked best for
large firms; attempting to target the smaller firms through the combination of
mandatory and optional levies has been ineffective. Several years after the start of the
scheme, almost half of the eligible firms in the 50-100 employee category had not
registered with the HRDF for the levy and, of those that had, only around half claimed
any reimbursement for training activities.17 If this pattern is repeated in Thailand, the
new SDF scheme will fail, since it encompasses primarily the smaller firms. This is
partly a question of adequate resources for enforcing compliance and partly one of the
scope of the scheme.
16
17

Phase 1 report, p. 89.
This was documented in the Phase 1 report, p. 90.
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Mechanisms to reduce cash/cost outlays by SMEs appear effective in securing their
participation. In certain cases the Malaysian HRDF, for example, makes direct
(partial) payment to a training provider on behalf of a firm.
The SDF Board should have sufficient degree of autonomy to modify the scope and
priorities of the scheme as needs arise and the skills base of companies develop. For
example the SDF schemes should allow for direct payment to be made to training
providers on behalf of small firms.
The SDF schemes should specifically and aggressively also target groups of SMEs for
joint training. This could be implemented through group training activities, activities
through employer organisations, industry groups, and TNC supplier chains. This
would enable small firms with the need and will to undertake training, but not the
capability to offer training, to ‘redraw their levy paid into the fund – in the form of
targeted training. The SDF should give some consideration to providing matching
funds to the levy to generate a sustainable and effective national training scheme.
Existing training schemes, such as those offered through the Productivity Institute
have been moving in this direction. These approaches should be strengthened both in
terms of quantity and quality.
Recommendation 2:
As the SDF develops there should be mechanisms to ‘hold the hand’ of smaller
companies by setting up training courses and funding company employees to
attend them. This could be achieved through cash contracts or grants to training
suppliers (who could be large firms, universities, GRIs) to provide specific
courses for groups of SMEs. There is no point in funding companies if the
required training courses do not exist – parallel support for the development of the
‘training industry’ is also essential.
A key challenge for effective skills and development concerns improving flexibility to
enable the SDF to respond to different priorities over time. Schemes such as those in
Malaysia and Singapore have changed in scope, levy rates, reimbursement rates and
priority training areas over the life of the schemes. For example, the schemes initially
focused on generic skills (even from the primary or secondary curriculum) and
evolved to fund (in addition) higher level, more specialised vocational skills.
Commenting on the Malaysian Fund, the consultants for Phase 1 noted: ‘the ability to
respond flexibly to specific plans and projects at the firm level may be an important
means of supporting demand-driven training development, but it also indicates the
importance of informed administrative support for the operation of such services’.18 In
order to improve flexibility and more effectively draw SMEs into SDF training
schemes, the SDF should consider introducing a system of training ‘credits’. These
could be allocated to firms who could spend them with any registered training
provider (including MNCs with the capacity to deliver appropriate training) over a
given period of time.

18

Phase 1 report, p. 92.
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There is already evidence that MNCs and local LSEs can provide, and are willing to
contribute to, the development of ‘train the trainer’ modules for delivery by Thai
training institutes. For example, BOI have recently received support from firms in the
electronics sector to create six day training modules for employees of local supplier
firms. This suggests that models for involving large firms in the delivery and the
development of training such as those used so effectively in Singapore could be
equally effective in Thailand.
Recommendation 3:
Assistance with the analysis of training needs, development of training strategies
and identification of appropriate training providers appears absolutely essential
for SMEs. The SDF must devote much of its resources to building this
fundamental planning capacity within firms. This has been regarded as one of the
most successful aspects of SDF schemes elsewhere, and also a critical component
of many incentive schemes that fund consultants to work with companies on
planning for their strategic needs. We recommend that a proportion of funds be
allocated specifically for this activity.
In relation to priorities for training, we concur with the recommendations from Phase
1 that there is a case for concentrating resources in ‘threshold’ areas of skill
development where under-investment is likely to be greatest. Government resources
for training should be targeted primarily at areas characterised by (1) high priority
skill activities in (2) sectors with good development prospects, and they should be
restricted to (3) firms that seem most likely to make efficient use of any grants
provided.
Recommendation 4:
The SDF Board should work closely with the private sector to identify priority
areas in which training funds should be concentrated. This process should take
account of priority sectors already identified by the government and priorities forshadowed by the National Competitiveness Committee. Such priorities should be
elaborated only after consultation with the private sector and in the light of indepth research.
Training in priority areas could be further encouraged by offering premium rates to
firms doing a disproportionate share of training within priority industries. This would
help overcome the concern expressed by some firms that in high demand skills areas
they experience high levels of outflow of trained staff. The industry as a whole can
benefit through outflows of trained staff through increased spillovers of skills from
individual firms.
At present there is no systematic audit of training needs for technology development
in priority industry clusters for Thailand. We propose that the SDF should work
closely with the IDF and OSMEP in carrying out the proposed sector study outlined
below in Section 4.5.
Experience indicates that it is critical to integrate the range of support mechanisms for
technology capability building within firms and not artificially splitting activities into
‘R&D’, engineering/technology development, training etc. As such, many of the
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proposals and options put forward above apply to support for technology development
activities such as design and engineering, as well as to training and skill development.
Integration of support for technology development and training is a key issue. It can
be argued that, ‘precisely because of the current stage of capability development and
technological learning in industry, there is a very blurred distinction between (1)
support for technology development and (2) support for developing the underlying
skills and capabilities needed to manage and implement it’. We therefore propose a
set of recommendations for revising the system of incentives that support technology
development and aligning them more effectively with incentives for enhancing skills
and training.

4.2

Recommendations for stimulating SMEs to improve technology capability
by undertaking design and engineering activities

Several issues have been raised in relation to incentives and support for other ‘nontraining’ incentives, particularly for SMEs. The first of these concerns the definition
of R&D. At present it appears too narrow, both in terms of the eligible applicants and
of the activities covered, to offer sufficient incentive for most Thai firms. The
requirement to register a separate research organisation (or R&D unit) within the firm
disadvantages SMEs in particular who may not have the organisational flexibility or
constancy that a separate R&D unit requires.
Recommendation 5:
The definition of R&D payments should be extended to cover all in-house
R&D performed by the firms themselves, not only within a firm’s registered
R&D ‘organisation’ or approved institution as under present arrangements.
Recommendation 6:
For SMEs only, the definition of R&D under current financial incentives
should be extended to cover technology development activities such as design
and engineering activities that contribute more widely to enhanced
productivity and competitiveness and not just activities directly linked to R&D
as is the case at present.
Many of the current schemes that support R&D are tax-based or loan-based. These are
not particularly attractive to SMEs who face problems in raising collateral or with
cash flow when compared with outright grants or ‘in kind’ support. On the other hand,
there appears to be limited uptake of grants from SMEs (and the private sector
generally) through the Thailand Research Fund. Under present arrangements, some
firms who receive grants through the TRF are not eligible to receive the 200% tax
concession for their private sector contribution because they are not carried out by an
approved R&D provider. This is out of line with international practice and a
disincentive for firms to apply for collaborative grants through the Fund.
Recommendation 5 would ensure that firms who have been allocated a matching grant
through for example TRF would be eligible to receive the 200% tax deduction for
their private sector contribution – irrespective of where the research is carried out.
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Further, R&D activities in firms in Thailand are more focused around development
than around research. We believe that TRF should give serious consideration toward
specifically targeting activities for matching grants with firms that emphasise
technology development rather than just research as it is generally understood in
universities and research institutions.
Grants under the NSTDA Department of Industrial and Business Development appear
well utilised and demand appears to be increasing. We suggest that this is because the
latter relate more closely to smaller firms’ needs for expert services and the need for
an easier way for firms to ‘learn to use’ the incentives that are available.

Recommendation 7:
We recommend that the programs of matching grants offered through NSTDA
schemes such as CD, ITAP, MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC, and through the
DIP of the Ministry of Industry schemes such as ITB, Project 13 or MDIC.
should be strengthened and be given greater flexibility in order to provide
greater incentives for SMEs.
This could be achieved, for example, by further promoting grants to groups of firms
and placing a high priority on supporting grants for projects that include a
combination of large and small firms. We note that among some of the NSTDA
schemes there is an emphasis being placed on grants to groups of firms. This provides
a stimulus to enhancing links between SMEs and larger firms with more advanced
technological capabilities. The Singapore LIUP scheme discussed in this report
provides an appropriate and successful model for this approach.
A further criticism of the existing incentives (and related to the comments on uptake)
is that they offer funding for defined R&D projects, but not for the support services
required to carry them out (advice, consultancy, capability-building etc.). Access to
expertise, consultancy and testing services is clearly a prerequisite for all but the most
capable larger firms. Any expansion of existing schemes should be in this area rather
than in support for R&D per se.
In order to support basic levels of technology capability development and learning in
Thai firms there should be a continued emphasis on strengthening the delivery and
coordination of technology and skills development schemes, such as through MOI
institutes that support expert consultancy and extension services, particularly to
SMEs. One way of working toward this aim would be for the newly developed Office
for SME Promotion to ensure a major component of their activities and support
programs are directed toward technology enhancement. We would suggest that at
least one third of their budget would be an appropriate proportion to target for this
critical area of development.

4.3

Building flexibility and options for incremental and progressive
technology development into the system

The recently established Innovation Development Fund offers the potential to support
more substantial and sector focused technology development activities. We note that
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to date it has only been possible to support a small number of projects. However,
given more resources and a higher priority in government, for example through the
National Competitiveness Committee (NCC), it would have the potential to provide a
second level of support for innovation and technological development to complement
the more basic capacity building provided through the innovation credits discussed
above. Under present arrangements the IDF is providing support at the level of other
programs available through NSTDA or DIP. Given sufficient support and autonomy it
could perform a more valuable role in the incentive system by supporting much larger
scale projects and involving larger numbers and clusters of firms along the supply
chain. This would enhance skills flows from larger to smaller firms. Other innovative
types of programs could include the provision of matching funds for industry
technology and training institutes, and programs that focus on building linkages
throughout the supply chain.
Recommendation 8:
We recommend the Innovation Development Fund be given a high level of
support from government and that it be established as an independent agency
under its own Act. Its activities should be coordinated with the delivery of
matching grants (or credits) through funds provided through NSTDA, DIP and
the newly formed OSMEP. Coordination could be achieved by allocating
responsibility to IDF or OSMEP for collating information on project delivery,
monitoring and evaluation. This agency should report directly to the National
Competitiveness Committee on monitoring and targeting technology
incentives in priority sectors.

One of the major findings of our review of the Thai schemes, when compared to
international bench-marks, is the organisational complexity they present for the firms
toward which they are targeted. It is important for the effectiveness of the overall
system that the various schemes should not be dysfunctionally competing with each
other but rather, offering complementarity. We therefore offer a range of suggestions
for the rationalisation of some schemes and improving the ability of firms to move
between schemes as their technology capacity deepens.
Recommendation 9:
We recommend building in greater flexibility to those schemes directed
toward enhancing engineering and design capability through the introduction
of ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’ available on a matching
basis and available only to SMEs.
Innovation credits would essentially provide grants along the lines of those already
offered through existing programs. However, the introduction of credits would allow
for greater flexibility enabling SMEs to direct their credits toward the range of
technology development services required by the firms. They would also provide the
opportunity for firms with similar needs to pool their credits. In other words they
would be adjusted to demand rather than being driven by supply.
Each eligible SME would be provided an annual allowance to ‘spend’ as it wishes on
a defined range of technology development services. Service provision would be
competitive and available through a range of providers including the private sector,
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GRIs, universities and foreign consultants. The ‘credit’ could fund activities in
approved external agencies or within the firm providing they are carried out with
approved agencies or specialists. Firms could accumulate credits for no more than 2-3
years and be allowed to participate in the scheme for up to 5 years, at which point
they would be required to ‘graduate’ to other larger schemes. The ‘credit’ would be a
small grant, paid to a third party. In the case of the UK Enterprise Initiative, it
amounted to the equivalent of 15 consultant-days; in other cases it has been variable,
for example related to the firm’s R&D personnel expenditure or other benchmarks.
In order to enable the schemes to respond more effectively to the innovation credits
there will be a need to achieve greater financial flexibility between schemes. As firms
are able to progress toward greater technological capability they are likely to place
greater emphasis on the acquisition of different skills for production processes.
International experiences have shown that as greater flexibility is introduced into the
system it is not always easy to predict changing patterns of demand. By introducing
greater budget flexibility, schemes can more effectively respond to demand while at
the same time being maintained within overall budget allocations.
Recommendation 10:
We recommend that the grants-based schemes available through NSTDA and
DIP should be given greater budget flexibility to enable funds to be transferred
between schemes according to demands within firms and the effective
implementation of the ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’.

We note that the BUILD program offered through BOI does not provide financial
incentives for technology development but that through its VMC Program, BUILD
does support the establishment of links between large and small firms. The objectives
of the VMC program therefore are closely aligned with the objectives of the grants
schemes discussed above, but with no resources to address the technology upgrading
often required to qualify an SME as a supplier. The impact and implementation of the
grants schemes could be strengthened if the VMC, NSTDA and DIP schemes are
coordinated and integrated with the development and delivery of the proposed
‘innovation credits for design and engineering’.
Recommendation 11:
We recommend that the activities undertaken through the BUILD VMC
programme be closely coordinated with the grants-based schemes available
through NSTDA and DIP, thereby marrying the linkage development efforts
with the technological development support services.
One option for achieving this would be to integrate responsibilities for these schemes
to the Ministry of Industry19. This would serve to draw together the substantial links
with large firms that have already been developed through BOI with the activities of
NSTDA and DIP that have been working more closely with smaller firms.

19

Indeed, it is planned in October 2002 for the BOI to be integrated as a department within the
Ministry of Industry.
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4.4

Enhancing the delivery, impact and coordination of grant-based schemes

An important issue for enhancing effective delivery of grants-based schemes is to
minimise the potential for corruption and misuse of grant funds. Awarding bodies
must be in a position to be able to scrutinise both the capability and honesty of
applicant firms. Where schemes are discretionary, decisions on awarding grants or
loans should be made by independent, expert committees. Their procedures and
decisions should be open to scrutiny by public audit. This also applies equally to other
financial incentives. Firstly, efforts must be made to choose recipients that are not
overly prone to opportunism or theft. Financial institutions in advanced economies do
this routinely, and agencies should also be able to find information on which to make
judgements as to the reliability of potential target firms. A second step is to enforce
agreements with firms to ensure that they abide by the terms on which incentives are
offered. This involves the development of suitable legal and other institutions (as well
as taking strenuous steps to make sure that agreements are adhered to.
Recommendation 12:
Financial sector organisations (such as the SME bank) should be contracted to
act as administrative and possibly also decision-making intermediaries
between the private sector claimants and the public sector funding agencies.

We recommend that the enhanced delivery mechanisms and accountability achievable
through the above recommendations should be matched with an increase in funds
directed toward those schemes delivering credits as proposed above. These would
essentially be directed toward grant-based schemes designed to stimulate technology
development through enhancing design and engineering capabilities not otherwise
covered through incentives directed toward increasing R&D.
The present study has revealed that many countries in the regions have been making
significant investments in technology capability building. It is difficult to make
sensible comparisons regarding the levels of investment devoted to this area in
different countries because there are so many variables that influence optimal models.
However, it is clear that given the current level of technology development in the
majority of Thai firms additional investment is required if Thailand is to provide an
incentive system that will return any substantial benefit. We note that Australia, for
example, devotes just under 19 percent of its total science and technology budget
toward schemes for supporting innovation in firms.20 This does not take into account
collaborative grants for R&D or cooperative research centres, which are also directed
toward technology development in firms. For Thailand, the need to enhance
technological capability in local firms is more pressing, yet indications are that budget
allocations are not great and the richness of schemes falls short of more successful
regional players. Without a considerable increase in the proportion of support directed
toward technological development in firms in Thailand, other S&T investments will
deliver increasingly smaller socio-economic returns.

20

Minister for Industry, Science and Resources (2000) Science and Technology Budget Statement
2000-01, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Canberra 2000.

51

Recommendation 13:
We recommend that the budget directed toward increasing technology
capabilities to firms other than for R&D should be increased to a level
approaching 15 percent of the national S&T budget. This should provide
sufficient stimulation for Thai firms to generate the capacity to more
effectively absorb and build on the technology capabilities of more advanced
firms and S&T institutions.
A further set of issues relates to the coordination and delivery of incentive programs.
There is a wide range of programs, with varying objectives, run by different Thai
government agencies. Several of the schemes include support for R&D, training or
technology acquisition/development as only part of their objective. It can be argued
that these incentives are ‘too general’ – and that firms do not know what they cover
and thus fail to take advantage of them.
Further, some agencies may not be best qualified to deliver the incentives. BOI for
example freely admits a lack of experience with R&D incentives. There also seems to
be a perception by firms that if they apply for a tax concession (or even a loan), this
application will somehow leave them open to additional scrutiny by the by revenue
raising (taxation) agencies. In this case, the close linkage of the R&D tax concession
with revenue collection agencies is a disincentive and they might be more effectively
delivered by a ‘neutral’ agency. (In Australia, similar incentives are administered by
the Industry Department on behalf of the Australian Taxation Office.)
In addition, different technologies have different learning requirements. Programs
tailored to the needs of one industry are therefore unlikely to be totally suitable for
firms in other industries. Intermediary agencies with sectoral experience may assist in
locating appropriate support for companies in the industry. In the case of Singapore’s
LETAS scheme, delivery of the incentives is devolved to sectoral agencies that are
familiar with the requirements of firms in their industry.
In order to deliver a comprehensive ‘system’ of financial incentives there is a strong
case for more deliberate coordination and integration of existing incentive schemes in
a national strategy.
Recommendation 14:
A single government agency such as the Office of SME Promotion should be
identified as the first point of contact for all schemes providing financial
incentive for R&D, technology acquisition and development, and technical
skills and training. The agency should have the task of publicising the schemes
and disseminating information on eligibility, guidelines for funding etc. and
for coordinating applications. Administration of the schemes would remain
with existing Department (such as BOI and MOF schemes).
Appropriate industry liaison bodies should be co-opted to deliver information
on the schemes to their members/constituents.
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4.5

The drive for national competitiveness

Enhancing industrial technology capability is a critical prerequisite for developing
competitiveness among Thai firms. The system of incentives discussed in this report
and the proposals for enhancing the present system should be a central feature of the
national competitiveness policy.
Recommendation 15:
We recommend that a ‘policy forum for technology development incentives’
be established with representatives of all key agencies involved in the delivery
of financial incentives for technology and skills development. The IDF and
OSMEP would be appropriate agencies to initiate such a forum that should
also have strong private sector representation. The forum should undertake to
coordinate the scope and delivery of the incentives, and develop a strategy for
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of the schemes. It should also
undertake to advise the National Competitiveness Committee and the Office
for SME Promotion on the scope and impact of the financial incentives system
and the level of financial resources required to support an effective incentives
regime.
Technology and skills development within Thai firms is a critical prerequisite for
national competitiveness. Because of the urgent need to coordinate and generate
greater efficiency and impact of public investments in raising technological capability
in Thai firms we believe the National Competitiveness Committee should take on the
task of establishing and chairing this forum. Because the NCC is not an implementing
agency it would ensure neutrality is maintained in chairing the forum.
Among the most immediate and pressing tasks for such a committee will be to
develop an information base. This should have two elements: one directed toward
program managers in firms; and another directed toward program managers of
incentive schemes. The former could provide on-line access to managers in firms to
assist them in identifying their technological problems and strategies for
implementing improvements. The latter would enable scheme managers, also through
an on-line service, to identify changing patterns and demands for services, successful
versus less successful activities and practices, and areas where large and small firms
are forming industry clusters. In addition it will assist them through sharing problems
associated with targeting, program delivery and evaluation as well as developing
strategies for dealing with them.
In order to provide for comprehensive and coordinated monitoring and evaluation of
schemes across the system the above committee should seek to develop an evaluation
framework to guide periodic and ongoing scheme-based monitoring and evaluation. A
useful model is the evaluation framework recently developed and refined by the
Australian Department of Education, Science and Training.
Throughout this report we have placed a strong emphasis on the need to target
financial incentives toward critical technology thresholds in Thai firms. At a general
level Phase 1 of this study identified an urgent need to enhance design and
engineering capabilities in many large domestic firms and most Thai SMEs. Evidence
collected through this project supports that observation. However, we believe that

53

further careful targeting can be directed toward the five industry priorities already
identified by the NCC. In Chapter 3 we outlined a set of criteria for targeting financial
incentives across sectors, firms and activities. An analysis of the critical technology
thresholds in each of these five national priority areas would allow for more specific
application of these criteria in areas where national priorities have already been
defined. In order to maximise impact in these areas we propose that a study is
undertaken to identify critical technology thresholds across each of sub-sectors
comprising the five priority industry clusters. This will ensure incentives build on
efforts and achievements already underway in the private sector. The study should
also be carried out in collaboration with SDF in order to more effectively target and
align incentives for skills and technology development.

4.6

Conclusion: an action agenda

The recommendations for revising the technology development incentive schemes
presented in this report involve a range of agencies involved with their planning,
delivery and evaluation. The complexity and fragmentation inherent in the present
structure was illustrated in Exhibit 8. In order to achieve the changes proposed here
we suggest an action plan that identifies key agencies responsible for some action on
each recommendation. We group these under the following agencies: NSTDA; BOI;
the Office for SME Promotion; the Skills Development Board; the Innovation
Development Fund; the Thailand Research Fund; and the Department of Revenue.

NSTDA
Recommendation 9:
Action: In collaboration with the Office for SME Promotion, design a program for the
implementation and finance of ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’
available to SMEs along the lines described above and to seek the support of the
National Competitiveness Committee and the Office for SME Promotion. The
innovation credits scheme could be initially implemented within current budget
constraints by targeting only key national priority industry sectors. The scheme could
be progressively extended into other areas.
Recommendation 10:
Action: Explore options with the Budget Bureau for budget flexibility to transfer funds
between schemes according to private sector demand.

BOI - MOI
Recommendation 11:
Action: In collaboration with NSTDA, coordinate the promotion, delivery and
evaluation of grants-based schemes available through NSTDA and DIP and in
particular to link large firms promoted through the BUILD program to the support
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and delivery of training for technology development in smaller firms and groups of
smaller firms.
Recommendation 13:
Action: In collaboration with NSTDA, propose a target budget in the S&T Action
Plan for increasing technology capabilities to support innovation credits at a level
approaching 15 percent of the national S&T budget.

Office for SME Promotion,
Recommendation 7:
Action: Promote the programs of matching grants offered through NSTDA and DIP to
enhance accessibility for SMEs.
Recommendation 12:
Action: Investigate the potential role of the SME bank, or other financial agency to be
contracted to act as administrative intermediaries between the private sector
claimants for grant-based incentives and public sector funding.
Recommendation 14:
Action: Establish a first and single point of contact for all schemes providing
financial incentive for enhancing technology and skills development for SMEs.

The Skills Development Board
Recommendations 1 - 4:
Action: Introduce mechanisms for involving the private sector in the design and
delivery of training, to introduce flexibility appropriate for SMEs, carrying out
research and planning, and responding to private sector training needs.

The Innovation Development Fund
Recommendation 8:
Action: To carry forward with NSTDA and BOI a plan for coordinating the delivery
of matching grants (or credits) and identifying responsibilities for collecting
information, promoting schemes and carrying out systematic monitoring and
evaluation.
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Recommendation 15:
Action: In collaboration with OSMEP and NSTDA, establish a ‘policy forum for
technology development incentives comprising key agencies involved in the delivery
of financial incentives for technology and skills development. The Forum should carry
out an initial set of tasks concerning coordination of information, promotion and
evaluation.
IDF, OSMEP and NSTD should take the first initiative to develop a proposal for the
NCC to support a study to investigate technology capabilities in key industry subsectors comprising the five national industry priority clusters. This should be
developed and carried out in collaboration with the SDF.

Thailand Research Fund
Recommendation 6
Action: Extend matching grants to Thai firms to support technology development
activities as well as research matching grants (see page 47).

Ministry of Finance - Department of Revenue
Recommendation 5:
Action: Remove the registration requirement on firms for eligibility for the 200%
R&D tax concession.
Recommendation 6:
Action: Extend the allowance for the 200% a tax concession to design and
engineering activities that contribute to enhanced productivity and competitiveness
for SMEs, but not necessarily directly emerging from R&D.

We believe that this action and the implementation of these recommendations will
significantly improve the system of financial incentives for enhancing Thailand’s
industrial technological capabilities. However, we concur with the observation made
in Phase 1 that ‘financial incentive mechanisms, however they are designed, will not
on their own induce radical change in attitude and behaviour’. The incentive regime
must be embedded in, and articulated with, Thailand’s broader strategies and
institutions for scientific and technological development and national
competitiveness. In particular, they should be consistent with and build on the efforts
already underway within firms in Thailand. We believe the recommendations offered
from this study will contribute toward that aim.
Finally, the recommendations and action identified above are focused on bringing
about some immediate change by stimulating demand for technology development in
the private sector. This approach, following international experiences, also contributes
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to the longer term objective of transferring the benefits from technology enhancement
in the private sector to Thai society more generally. We therefore draw attention to
the need to complement the recommendations made in this report with longer term
strategies for improving S&T education in primary, secondary and higher education
throughout Thailand.

57

58

Attachment 1
Table A1: Administrative benefits and constraints on different forms of financial
incentive for research and technology development
Assistance
measure
Tax
concession

Benefits

Of no benefit to
unprofitable/start-up
firms.

Businesses more likely to
be aware of taxation
benefits.

Subsidises ‘existing’
activity that would have
occurred anyway (unless
based on incremental
performance, which is
hard to police).

Relatively simple administration.

Abuse eg ‘double
dipping’ – if firms also
eligible to claim loans or
grants.

Requires careful accounting of
eligible costs within the firm.

Maintenance of firm
confidentiality.
Speedy processing (where
approval ‘automatic’).

Can be targeted widely or
for focused activities.
Priorities or scope (type,
timing, size) set by govt.,
specific proposals made
by firms.

Grants

Budgetary/Administrative/Legal
issues
Cost is open-ended (difficult to
control the level of revenue
foregone).

Non-discriminatory: open
to all firms that meet
stated criteria.

‘Arm’s length’
instrument: activities
chosen by industry.

Repayable
loans

Possible constraints

Generally for focused
activities. Priorities or
scope set by govt.,
specific proposals made
by firms.

Does not require annual approval of
budget.
Usually requires changes to taxation
legislation.

Problems of definition and legal
interpretation arise.

Selection criteria may
encourage risk aversion to
achieve short-term
repayment.
Less likely to subsidise
activity that would have
occurred in any case.
Formal application may
be required.
Cumbersome and lengthy
selection procedure.

Less likely to subsidise
activity that would have
occurred in any case.
Formal application
required. Cumbersome
and lengthy selection
procedure.

Maximum cost can be set, but actual
cost hard to determine.
Requires annual budget.
Requires formal procedure for
application and selection.
Difficult to decide what constitutes a
successful outcome for the purpose
of repayment – clear criteria
required.
Annual cost is set.
Requires clear criteria for selection
and evaluation of outcomes.
Requires formal procedure for
application and selection.
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Table A2: A framework for assessing the coverage of grant-based government assistance for technology capability development within
firms
Objective
A. Assistance targeted at
individual firms
1. Strategic capabilities
(awareness of the
technological and business
environment)

2. Management of tangible
technological resources
(products, equipment,
design)

3. Management of intangible
technological resources
(knowledge, skills and
training)

Types of assistance required

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Business capability development
Business and technology audits
Mentoring by other firms or organisations; industry ‘masterclasses’
Awareness, visits to ‘demonstration’ sites, technology benchmarking
etc
Feasibility assessments
Subsidies for R&D
Subsidies for development of technology or for particular types of
technology (e.g. ITC, biotechnology)
Selection of plant and equipment
Manufacturing consultancies
Subsidy for adoption (purchase) of technologies (e.g. CNC, IT)
Feasibility assessment - new product or process development

a) Quality programs
b) Placement of skilled personnel within firm (e.g. secondment of
postgraduates, technicians or technical managers, graduate
recruitment, salary subsidy)
c) Loan/secondment of R&D personnel
d) Training needs/strategy analysis
e) Training course subsidies
f) Secondment of firm’s personnel to other firms/organisations

Example of foreign schemes that provide
such assistance21

The Enterprise Initiative (UK) (a, b, e)
National Technology Audit Program -NTAP
(Irl.) (b)
Benchmarking Index (UK) (a, b)
SMART Scheme (UK) (e)
LETAS (Sing.) (a, b, e)
NTAP (Irl.) (c)
SMART Scheme (UK) (b, c, e)
Feasibility Grants (Irl.) (f)
Steinbeis Foundation for Economic Promotion
(Germ.) (d)
LETAS (Sing.) (d, f)
R&D Start (Aust.) (a, b)
SDF (Sing.) (b)
Techstart and Techman (Irl.) (b, c)
KIM (Netherl.) (b)
Engineers to Japan (UK) (f)
LETAS (Sing.) (a, d)
R&D Start (Aust.) (b)
SDF (Sing.) (d, e)
HRDF (Malay.) (d, e)

21
The basic structure and examples are taken from Arnold et al (2000), modified and extended by the current study. The European examples herein are also from the Phase 1
report, pp. 147-170, where details of each scheme mentioned may be found.
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Table A2 (cont.)
4. Organisational structures
and assets
5. Linkage and networking
capabilities (ability to
access external
knowledge, to manage
user-producer relations, to
form alliances with
partners)
B. Assistance targeted at
groups of firms and
technology organisations
Linkage and networking
capabilities

a)
b)
a)
b)
c)
d)

Technology management courses
Technology management consultants
Subsidies for use of external consultants or expert services
Subsidies for use of university or GRI staff
Subsidised access to GRIs and quality/testing/standards facilities
‘Innovation credits’ allowing firms to purchase services from a
range of providers

a) Subsidised and/or facilitated R&D or technology development
collaborations or networks
b) Support for university-industry GRI collaboration
c) Technology transfer or brokerage (GRI-industry; university to
industry, firm to firm)
d) Industry associations, and their firm networks
e) Technology centres, tech. Parks
f) Liaison offices and information services
g) Support for firm’s ‘supplier development’ programs
h) Public procurement
i) ‘Partner search’ programs
j) Firm to firm network programs (e.g. MNC-SME, SME networks)
k) Support for technology demonstration projects and
publications/information diffusion
l) Personnel exchanges between firms

R&D Management Scheme (Irl.) (a)
LETAS (Sing.) (b)
Innovation Vouchers scheme (UK) (d)
LETAS (Sing.) (a)
HRDF (Malay.) (a)

BTS and predecessor schemes (Netherl.) (a, b,
g, j))
Steinbeis Foundation for Economic Promotion
(Germ.) (c. j)
Technologie Transfer Ring Handwerk (Germ.)
(c, d)
Programs in Advanced Technology PATS
(Irl.) (b, c).
FMW (Germ.) (b, c, l)
RUK (Indon.) (b)
LETAS (Sing.) (f)
SDF (Sing.) (d, j)
HRDF (Malay.) (j)

61

Attachment 2:
Diagnostics for Reviewing the System of Schemes
1.

International Benchmarking

•
•
•

Scope of scheme by comparison with international best practice.
Scale (budget, coverage) of scheme by comparison with international best practice.
Impact of scheme on the client population by comparison with international examples.

2.
•
•
•
•
•
•

3.
•
•
•
•
•
4.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Formatted: Indent: Hanging: 0.75",
Outline numbered + Level: 2 +
Numbering Style: Bullet + Aligned at:
0.5" + Tab after: 0.75" + Indent at:
0.75"

Clarity of Structure and Goals
Presence of clearly defined objectives for the scheme.
A clearly defined client base (target population) for the scheme.
Degree of awareness of scheme and its components on the part of putative clients (target
population).
Absence of countervailing schemes (e.g. other incentives that make this incentive less
attractive or unattractive to clients).
Absence of overlap with other incentive schemes.
Unambiguous definition of activities covered, eligibility criteria, guidelines for applicants
etc.
Effective Management
Good procedures and management practices in place
Transparency of administration
Funds allocated by an expert panel.
Scheme is managed by a dedicated, expert secretariat familiar with technological
innovation.
Presence of explicit performance measures or indicators for the scheme.
Client and Scheme Performance
Number of clients (by comparison with the target population). Is demand for the scheme
growing?
Quality of applications; success rate of applications (grants as proportion of applications)
Evidence of user satisfaction (grant/loan recipients) with scheme.
‘Success stories’ of projects/companies supported by the scheme.
Expenditure of funds as proportion of allocated budget.
Existence of any evaluation (internal or external) of the effectiveness of the scheme.
Effective use of resources: Scheme operating costs as a proportion of total scheme
budget; Program operating costs per client.
(For loans) rate of recovery of loan funds.
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Attachment 3
Exhibit 11: Examples of Skills development incentives in Singapore
Environment:
• Singapore has a sound education system, with a bias to early vocational training.
• A range of public and private training providers operates in competitive
environment.
• A range of human resource development programs apart from the SDF is in place.
• Skills Development Fund: Financing and Administration
• Its SDF is long-standing: established 1979 under the National Productivity Board,
Trade and Industry Ministry.
• The SDF has evolved: originally established with employer subsidies; moved to
planned training priorities, 1987; adopted an SME focus, 1992.
• It is funded by a 1% employer levy on low-paid, unskilled workers; At times the
levy has been set higher: at 2% (initially) and 4%.
• Its budget in 1996-7 was S$86 mill.
• Most of its budget comes from industry funding and interest on invested funds;
only 2% is from government funds (1991 figures). However, expenditure is
currently exceeding the amount raised from levies; and government ‘tops up’ the
Fund.
• Assistance is provided on a cost sharing principle: SDF pays 50-80% of cost,
employers pay 20-50%.
• It has provided grants for more than 500,000 training places.
• In 1990, 30,000 approvals were made; a 90% success rate.
• It requires prior approval for programs and involves a 2-year wait for
reimbursement in some cases.
• Monitoring and evaluation are carried out at three levels:
• Macro-level (skills shortages, redundancies)
• Program level (various performance indicators)
• Firms/trainees (client quality control/tracer studies)
• The SDF manages a broad portfolio of schemes/programs.
SDF Schemes & Programs
• Training Grants
• Training Leave (for unskilled mature workers)
• Training Vouchers (all firms are eligible)
• Worker Training Plan (to support a firm-level approach to training)
• Training Needs Analysis Consultancy Scheme (assistance with training strategy
for locally-owned firms)
• Approved-in-principle Scheme (pre-accreditation of public courses, making it
easier for firms to use them)
• Emerging/Critical Skills Development Grants (eg in nominated priority areas like
robotics, wafer fabrication, health care)
• Basic Education for Skills Training - BEST (providing fundamental functional
literacy/numeracy, to ‘Year 6’ level).
• Worker Improvement Through Secondary Education - WISE (English, Maths)
• Training Infrastructure Development
• Partnerships with MNCs to set up industry-specific training centres.
• Financial assistance to trades union groups for training.
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Exhibit 12: Examples of Skills development incentives in Malaysia
Environment:
• There is strong industry involvement in training, especially with MNCs as partners.
• In several cases, an effective regional focus has been successfully created (eg the Penang
Skills Development Centre, where ‘competing companies pool their resources’).
Malaysian HRD Fund and Council: Funding and Administration
• HRD Fund and Council were in established 1992; under the Ministry of Human
Resources and have been in operation since 1993.
• Council comprises 14 members: 8 from industry, 4 from government, and 2 independent
(i.e. a non-government majority).
• The Fund covers all manufacturing and selected service industries.
• There is a mandatory 1% levy on the payroll of firms with 10 or more staff which have
high capital assets (50 or more staff in manufacturing).
• In addition, there is an optional 0.5% levy on manufacturing firms with 10-50 staff which
have low capital assets.
• The budget is MYR 50 mill. of levy/interest funds, plus MYR 16 mill. government funds
• The levy is collected through the commercial banking system.
• Grants defray partial costs. Firms can reclaim the levy they paid in each year, up to 75%
or 80% of the costs of training.
• Eligibility for grants/loans
• Firms must be registered (i.e. they must be levy-payers and up-to-date with their
payments; levy defaulters are barred from receiving support).
• The trainees must be Malaysian citizens.
• The training mode must be approved by the HRDC, although there is some ‘pre-approval’
of training providers, training courses and, importantly, firms’ own annual training plans.
• Eligible skill areas are defined, but quite broad. The overriding criterion is that training
must be of direct benefit to the business.
Malaysian HRDF: Schemes and programs
• SBL: Grants for all types of firm-based training for registered firms.
• SBL Pre-Approved: As above, for regular in-house programs. For example, induction
courses for new recruits do not require individual approval if the content is the same.
• PROLUS: Reimbursement for recognised external training courses. There is a register of
approved providers / training programs from both the public and private sectors.
• PERLA: Companies pay 20-25% of course fee to the approved provider, the HRDC pays
balance to provider. This is particularly useful for SMEs who do not have to provide the
money ‘up front’.
• JURUPLAN: Provides assistance from consultants in developing the firm’s annual
training plans (HRDF meets 50-70% of the cost of the consultant).
• PLT: Provides blanket approval of firms’ annual training plans
• SLB: Supports joint in-house training schemes, i.e. cooperation in training provision
between firms, especially between SMEs and MNCs.
• Apprenticeship scheme: eg mechatronics/electronics; hotel industry (100% cost)
• Industrial automation for manufacturing workers: external providers (95% of costs for
approved courses).
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Attachment 4: (A) Table on Financial Incentives for R&D Technology Development and Innovation in Thai
Firms
Note: The information in this table is presently being compiled and checked as part of a project being carried out by Wollongong University and the Brooker Group for the National
Science and Technology Development Agency with financial support from the World Bank. It represents a work in progress and will be a key input into the final outputs from the
project designed to enhance the financial incentive system to support industrial competitiveness in Thailand.
1. Office of the Prime Minister
Monitoring
Critical Issues
Institution
Scheme
Mechanism
Objective
Current
Private Sector
System
Legislation
“Take Up”
Budget
1.1 Office of Promotion for R&D
(1996-2000)
• To promote
• Section 28• Tax-based incentives: tax
• Private investors
• Submission
Formatted: Indent: Left: 0",
the Board of Activities – Activities
firm based
holidays (scale of incentives
31, 33-36 of the Average
of balance
not enthusiasticHanging: 0.11", Bulleted + Level: 1
+ Aligned at: 0" + Tab after: 0.25"
Investment
7.12
investment =
R&D
are subject to location of
Investment
sheet to BOI • Incentives provided
+ Indent at: 0.25"
(BOI)
77.25
million
Promotion for
activities whether located in
Promotion Act,
by firms
• Encourage firm
for R&D activities
Indent: Left: 0",
Baht per project
Scientific Laboratories
special investment promotion
B.E. 2520
once a year
based R&D
are quite similarFormatted:
to
– Activities 7.13
zones, nature of production – • Encourage
• Board of
• Site
general BOI Hanging: 0.11", Bulleted + Level: 1
+ Aligned at: 0" + Tab after: 0.25"
17 firms
export, or engaging in
Promotion for
incentives granted
Investment
inspection at
technology
+ Indent at: 0.25", Tabs: 0.11", List
approved
industries identified as
Calibration Services –
to other activities
Announcement
the
acquisition
tab + Not at 0.25"
Priority Activities
Activities 7.14
1/2543
beginning of • Focused primarily
• Non-tax privileges:
the project
Promotion for
• BOI
on services for
guarantees, protections,
and when
Educational Institutes
firms rather than in
Notification No.
permissions, and services
requesting
or Vocational Training
firms –
Sor. 11/2532
(regardless of location)
for project
Centers – Activities
• Difficult to predict
• BOI
expansion
7.15.1
• Income tax concession on the
Announcement
budget implications
payment for Goodwill,
No. Por 13/2544
in advance
Copyright, Patent,
• Incentives offered
Trademark, Royalty, Knowby other countries
how, etc.
are more
• Tax-based incentives: 8 year
customized and
income tax holidays or tariff
attractive
exemptions, without zoning
• Lack of qualified
issue (only for activities)
researchers
• Income tax exemption
dividend derived from the
promoted activities
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Institution

Scheme

2. Ministry of Finance
R&D Machinery and
2.1 The
Equipment
Revenue
Depreciation
Department

2.1 The
Revenue
Department

Tax Concession for
R&D Expenditure

Mechanism

40% depreciation rate of the
cost of machinery/
equipment on the acquired
date in the first year, and
lower as indicated in general
accounting practice in the
following years

•

•
•
Institution

Scheme

Applicable to certified
bodies (total number of
34):
¾ Subordinate
research unit
¾ Independent
research unit/
company
¾ University
laboratories and
government
research
organizations
200% of R&D
expenditure for tax
computation
Project certified by
NSTDA
Mechanism

Objective

•

•

•
•

To promote
R&D activities
by reducing tax
burden
Encourage firm
based R&D

Encourage firm
contracting out
R&D projects
Promote local
R&D firms/ units

Objective

Current
Legislation

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

• Section 65 bis (2)
of the Revenue
Code,
• Section 4 bis of
Royal Decree
No. 145, B.E.
2527
• Director-General
Notification on
Income Tax No.
48

N/A

• Section 3(1) of
the Revenue
Code,
• Royal Decree
No. 297, B.E.
2539
• Ministry of
Finance
Notification on
Income Tax No.
3, dated 16
December B.E.
2539
• Departmental
Instruction No.
Por 103/2544

(2001-April
2002)
• 132.8
million Baht
approved
(9 projects)
•
296.2
million Baht
under
consideratio
n
(9 projects)

Current

Monitoring
System

Critical Issues

• Non specific
monitoring
system for
firms
applying the
scheme –
only general
tax
assessment
system
available

•

• Following up
with firms by
NSTDA on
progress of
the project

•

Focused mainly
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Legislation
2.1 The
Revenue
Department

2.2 The
Customs
Department

Certified training
providers are allowed to
have tax exemption for
generated profits

•

To promote
training
providers

•

150% tax concession for
expenditure on
employee training
¾ Training with the
Department of Skill
Development
¾ In-house training
approved by the
Department of Skill
Development
• Scientific tools: 30-40%
to 5% or less
• R&D chemical substance:
30% to 5-20%
• Environmentally sound
and economically
machinery:
30-40% to 5%
• Computer and computer
parts: 20-40% to 5-1%
• Electronics Parts: 35% to
1%
• Scientific education
equipment: tax exempted
• R&D testing equipment:
15-35% to 5%

•

Promote training
through certified
training
institutions

•

Tax exemption for
training providers

•

Tax Concession for
Training Expenditure

•

Deduction/ Exemption
of R&D Machinery
Import Duties

•
•

To encourage
technology
acquisition
To reduce cost
conducting R&D

Section 3(1) of
the Revenue
Code, Royal
Decree No.
284, B.E. 2538
Section 3(1) of
the Revenue
Code, Royal
Decree No.
298, B.E. 2539

“Take Up”
Budget
N/A

(1996-2000)
Average 175
Million Baht a
year or 1.16
million Baht
per firm

System
N/A

N/A

•

•

N/A

•

Lack of skill
development
policy to meet
industry’s needs
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Institution

2.4 EXIM
Bank

Scheme
•
¾
¾
•

2.5 Small
Industry
Credit
Guarantee
Corporation
(SICGC)

Term Loan for
Machinery
Upgrading
Machinery
upgrading
Replacement of
used machinery
Modification of
machinery

Credit Guarantee

Mechanism
•
•

•

•

•

Objective

Soft loan with 5-7 year
repayment term
Loan not exceed Baht
200 million

•

To promote
production
capacity for
exporters

Guarantee unsecured
credit but not exceeding
50% of the total credits
with the lender
Maximum guarantee
amount not exceeding
Baht 40 million for each
enterprise
Annual fee at 1.75% of
guaranteed amount,
payable in advance

•

To assist SME
lacking fixed
assets to
guarantee loan to
be able to obtain
more loan from
commercial
banks

Current
Legislation

•

Section 11,
12(1) and (9)
of the SICGC
Act, B.E. 2534

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget
(2000)
4.79 billion
Baht

Total
outstanding
loan in 2000:
755 million
Baht

Monitoring
System
N/A

Critical Issues
•

Available for
exporters only

•

Fees considered
high
Not well known
to SME

•
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Institution

Scheme

Mechanism

3. Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment
3.1 Permanent Revolving Fund for
• Soft loan for R&D
Secretary
Technological
¾ Baht 10 million
Office,
Research and
loan per project
MOSTE
Development
¾ 2.5% interest rate
¾ less than 8 years
maturity
• Soft loan for building up
laboratory
¾ Baht 10 million
loan per project
¾ MLR-4% interest
rate
¾ less than 8 years
maturity
• Soft loan for production
process development
and R&D
commercialization
¾ Baht 10-20 million
¾ MLR-3% interest
rate
¾ less than 5 years
maturity

Objective

•

•

•

•

Conducting
technological
R&D project
which must be
able to
commercialize
Provision of
laboratory
equipment or
building up
laboratory
Product and
process
development/
improvement
Commercializati
on of R&D
results

Current
Legislation

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Monitoring
System

(1997-2000)
Average 62.2
million Baht a
year

• Site
inspection
by a subcommittee

Critical Issues

• Fixed interest rate
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Institution
3.2 National
Science and
Technology
Development
Agency
(NSTDA)

Scheme
Innovation
Development Fund

Mechanism
•
¾

¾

¾

•
¾

•
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾

Grants
For projects in stage of
prototype, pilot plant,
pre commercial, full
scale trial or
commercial start up
Not more than 50% of
total budget proposed
by the team and lesser
than Baht 10 million
Recover grant after the
project has been
commercialized (full
amount repayment or
monthly royalty fees
Soft loan and
investment funds
Focusing on projects
requiring financial
support of more than
Baht 10 M
Technical Support
Provide assistance in
project development
Conclude the project
and disseminate
information
Technical training
Hire experts for
technology transfer
Reengineer business
process & management

Objective
•

•

•
•

•

Focusing on
business
innovation/
development
projects
To support
private sector
design and create
prototype
To provide
expertise to
private sector
To promote
market survey to
acquire basic
information for
innovation
To provide initial
fund for
commercializing
innovative
products

•
•

Current
Legislation
Section 12 of
the NSTDA
Act, B.E. 2534
NSTDA
Regulations on
the IDF
Management,
B.E. 2542

Private Sector
“Take Up”
(1997-2000)
Average 9.93
million Baht a
year
(26 projects
approved)

Monitoring
System
• IDF
manageme
nt
committee
to report
project
progress
and
expenditure
to NSTDA
board every
3 months

Critical Issues
•
•

•

•

•

Very little uptake
Unavailability of
matching fund as
a result of firms’
non performing
loan (NPL)
status
Project
evaluation
criteria is very
strict
Lack of
understanding of
R&D capability
[?]in firms
Lack of
capability in
evaluating
projects in
business aspect
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Institution

3.2 National
Science and
Technology
Development
Agency
(NSTDA)

Scheme

Standards, Testing and
Quality Control: STQC
• Technical
Assistance for
Productivity
Improvement
• In-house and
public training
• Consultancy
services
• Advisory services
on ISO9000
Thai Foundation
Quality System
Standard (TFQS)
Development Project

Mechanism

Objective

Consultancy services
and technical assistance

•

To promote
firms acquiring
international
standards for
productivity
improvement

50% support of expenditure
occurred from TFQS quality
system standard set up but
lesser than Baht 30,000

•

To promote
firms acquiring
industrial
standard for
firms not able to
acquire ISO9000

•
•

Current
Legislation
•

Section 12,
NSTDA Act,
B.E. 2534

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget
N/A

Monitoring
System

Critical Issues

N/A

Monitoring by
an auditor

•

•

Strong
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Institution

3.2 National
Science and
Technology
Development
Agency
(NSTDA)

Scheme
¾
¾
¾

MTEC
BIOTEC
NECTEC

Mechanism
•

•
•

100% of expenditure
grant for research
projects in universities,
lesser than Baht 5
million
75% of expenditure
grant for basic research
by private sector
50% of expenditure
grant for research that is
almost ready for
marketing

Objective
•

To promote
private and
public sector
doing R&D and
innovation

Current
Legislation
•

Section 12,
NSTDA Act,
B.E. 2534

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Monitoring
System
N/A

Critical Issues
•

Competing with
Formatted: Indent: Left: 0",
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Institution

3.2 National
Science and
Technology
Development
Agency
(NSTDA)

Scheme

Mechanism

Company Directed
Technology
Development Program:
CD
• Financial Support
to Private Sector
Promoting R&D
and Innovation

• Soft loans
¾ Maturity lesser than 7 years
¾ Supported by financial
institutions participating in
the project
¾ Government supports 2/3
of the total loan while the
rest is supported by
participated financial
institution (not more than
75% of the project value
and lesser than 30 million
Baht)
¾ Private sector has to invest
not lesser than 50% of the
total investment
¾ Interest rate = (Reference
Rate + 2.25%) / 2
• Grants
¾ Grant not more than 50%
of total investment and
lesser than Baht 3 million
per project
¾ 67% grant of total
investment, but lesser than
Baht 3 million per project
is available in some cases
¾ Repay the loan when
research results could be
commercialized
¾ No longer available

Objective
•

•

To promote and
support R&D
and engineering
in private sector
To stimulate
private sector
innovate new
products by
providing
grants and soft
loans to reduce
R&D risks

Current
Legislation
•
•

Section 12,
NSTDA Act,
B.E. 2534
NSTDA
regulations on
project
approval for
1) soft loan
and 2) grants

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget
(1996-2000)
Average amount
• NSTDA’s
investment:
52.47 million
Baht
• 39 projects
approved

•

NSTDA’s
investment: 5
million Baht

Monitoring
System
Monitoring
every 6 months
by ITA and
experts

Critical Issues
• Firms still have
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Institution

3.2 National
Science and
Technology
Development
Agency
(NSTDA)

Scheme

Mechanism

Objective

Current Legislation
•

Industrial Technology
Assistance Program
(ITAP) – (formerly
known as ICS)

•

Grant not exceeding
50% of the total
expenses and within
Baht 500,000
supporting expert fee
in conducting
technology
development
program

•

To enhance
production
capability in
SMEs through
use of
consultants

Support for
Technology
Acquisition and
Mastery Program:
STAMP
• Technology Site
Visit
• Technology
Acquisition
• Appropriate
Technology
Sourcing

•

Grants supported for
airfare

•

To support
technology
acquisition and
technology
transfer

Section 12,
NSTDA Act,
B.E. 2534

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget
(1996-2000)
Average 8.77
million Baht a
year

(1996-2000)
Average 1.03
million Baht a
year

Monitoring
System
Evaluation
during the
beginning of the
project with
interim
monitoring that
incorporates
comments from
experts and
firms. At the end
of the project, a
report submitted
by firms

Critical Issues
• Firms have to Formatted: Indent: Left: 0",
Hanging: 0.1", Bulleted + Level: 1 +
advance the
expenditure and Aligned at: 0" + Tab after: 0.25" +
at: 0.25", Tabs: 0.1", List tab
taking time to be Indent
+ Not at 0.25"
reimbursed
• Language barrier
between foreign
consultants and Thai
firms
• Implementation of
recommendations is
still a problem
• Firms’ attitudes
towards their
competitiveness
when the same
consultant provide
services to their
competitors
Controversial issue
whether traveling is
work or pleasure
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Institution

3.2 National
Science and
Technology
Development
Agency
(NSTDA)

3.3 Thailand
Institute of
Scientific and
Technological
Research

Scheme

Intellectual Property
Services: IPS
• Consultancy
Services
• Training/ Seminars
• Intellectual
Property
Application Filing
Services

Free of charge except IP
application filing services

NSTDA Investment
Center (NIC)

• Joint-venture with private
enterprises in science and
technology investment that is
vital to the country
• Investment by NSTDA should
not be more than 49%
• Scientific analysis
• Product testing
• Product standardization
• Research and development
• Manufacturing process design
and development
• Consultation
• Transfer of technology to rural
areas
• Disseminate information to
researchers and stakeholders

Laboratory Services

Research and
Development Services

Technology transfer

Objective

Mechanism
•

•

•

Current
Legislation

To promote
registration
and
protection of
intellectual
property
rights

•

To develop
feasible
technology
investment
project

Section 12,
NSTDA Act, B.E.
2534

To initiate
and provide
S&T service

•

•

Section 12,
NSTDA Act,
B.E. 2534
NSTDA
Regulations
on the
Registration
and Benefits
of Intellectual
Property,
B.E. 2543

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Monitoring System

N/A

Profitability of
firms

Critical Issues

N/A
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Institution

Scheme

4. Ministry of Industry
4.1 Thailand
Public and in-house
Productivity
Training Courses
Institute
Consultation Services
4.2 National
Food Institute
4.3 Thai
Automotive
Institute

Mechanism

•
•
•

Provides training to
public
Training cost subsidized
by government
No charge

Objective

•

Current
Legislation

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Monitoring
System

Critical Issues

Human resource
development for
productivity
improvement

•
•

Training
Laboratory
Services
Testing
Supplier Development
Program

• Applicable to SMEs
• Group consulting:
supporting funds of Baht
200,000 for expert fee per
factory
• Individual consulting:
supporting funds of 75%
but lesser than Baht
200,000 for expert fee per
factory
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Hanging: 0.09", Bulleted + Level: 1
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Enhancing
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Program
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supported by JETRO,
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Institution
4.4 Electrical
and
Electronics
Institute
4.5 Thai
German
Institute
(Thailand)

Scheme

Mechanism

Objective

Current
Legislation

Private Sector
“Take Up”

Monitoring
System

Critical Issues

•

Product testing and
calibration
services
• Training
Training
• Automation
Technology
• CNC/ CAD/ CAM
Technology
• Tool & Die
Technology
• Energy
Management
• Plant Maintenance
Industrial Consultancy
Services
• HRD advice
• Training needs
assessment
• Design of machine
process prototypes
• Advice on reducing
production
downtime,
maintenance and
running costs
• Advice on
upgrading
production/
processes

•

Funding supported by
the German gvt, MOI
and Thai and German
private sector
• Short modules
• Teaching factory
• Small group teaching
• Hi-tech equipment
training
• In-plant training
Funding supported by the
German government and
MOI

To train technicians
in Advanced
Manufacturing
Technology to
become high skilled

Cabinet
Resolution on
September 12,
1992

Need to link
monitoring,
evaluation and
promotion with
other similar
schemes
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Institution

4.6
Department of
Industrial
Promotion

Scheme

Invigorating Thai
Business Program

Consultancy Service

Mechanism
• Grants supporting expert
fees
¾ 90% for firms with less
than 100 employees
¾ 80% for firms with more
than 100 employees
• Grants supporting expert
fees – 20% of the total
budget but lesser than Baht
200,000

Project 13

• Grants supporting expert
fees – 50% but lesser than
200,000 Baht

MDIC

• Grants supporting expert
fees – 2/3 of the cost but
not more than 900,000
Baht
• Grants support 50% of
training cost directly to
consultant but lesser than
150,000 Baht

Training Fund

Objective
•

Current
Legislation

Monitoring
System

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Critical Issues
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• Progress
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project
• Report by
consultants
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Institution

Scheme

Mechanism

5. Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
5.1
Skill Development
Soft loan for trainees, 1%
Department of Fund
interest rate, for training
Skill
expenses and personnel
Development
expenditure occurred during
the training
Training
• Provides skill
• Basic Training
development training
• Skill Upgrading
• Cost of training
Training
subsidized by the
government
• Skill Certification

Objective

Current
Legislation

•

To promote
employees
receive more
training

N/A

•

To provide
training for nonskilled and
skilled workers

•

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Monitoring
System

Critical Issues

Section 13,
Vocational
Training
Promotion
Act, B.E.
2537
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Institution

Scheme

6. Independent Agencies
6.1
• Industrial
Technology
Instrument
Promotion
Calibration
Association
Services
(Thailand¾ Electrical
Japan)
¾ Pressure
¾ Mass &
Balance
¾ Temperature
¾ Guage Block
¾ Humidity
¾ Length
• Training Services
to suit the needs of
Thai Industry
¾ Management
Technology
¾ Industrial
Technology
¾ Technological
Information
Center

Mechanism

•
•

Technology supported
by TPA members
Subsidized by funds
supporting TPA from
MITI

Objective

•

Current
Legislation
•

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget

Monitoring
System

Critical Issues

Need to link
monitoring,
evaluation and
promotion with
other similar Formatted: Indent: Left: 0.25",
schemes.
Bulleted + Level: 1 + Aligned at: 0"
+ Tab after: 0.25" + Indent at:
0.25"

•
•

Technology supported
by TPA members
Subsidized by funds
supporting TPA from
MITI

•

Formatted: Indent: Left: 0.25",
Bulleted + Level: 1 + Aligned at: 0"
+ Tab after: 0.25" + Indent at:
0.25"

•

Formatted: Indent: Left: 0.25",
Bulleted + Level: 1 + Aligned at: 0"
+ Tab after: 0.25" + Indent at:
0.25"
Formatted: Indent: Left: 0.25",
Bulleted + Level: 1 + Aligned at: 0"
+ Tab after: 0.25" + Indent at:
0.25"
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Institution

6.2 Office of
the Thailand
Research
Development
Fund

Scheme

Industrial Research
Support Scheme:
Medical Equipment
Project; Jewelry and
Ornament Industrial
Development: SME
Project; Agricultural
Machinery and
Industry; Textile
Industrial
Development; Para
Rubber Industrial
Development; General
Production
Development; Wood
and paper Pulp
Industrial
Development;
Industrial Research
Associate Support
Program; Industrial
Projects for
Undergraduate
Students

Mechanism
•

•

•

Non specific amount of
supporting grants but
also require investment
from the private sector
(at least 20% of the total
project value)
Technical assistance by
providing experts
preparing project
proposals
Grants not exceeding
Baht 50,000 for issue
identification and
additional Baht 50,000
for project proposal
preparation

Objective
•

•

To promote
research and
development in
industrial sector
for technology
upgrading, both
production and
management
Emphasis on
SME at the
beginning stage

Current
Legislation
•

Section 6(1)
of Thailand
Research
Development
Fund Act,
B.E. 2535

Private Sector
“Take Up”
Budget
(1992-2000)
Average
TRF
Investment: 39
million Baht
Private Sector
Investement:
16 million
Baht

Monitoring
System
•

Site visit or
presentation
on progress of
the project to
project
committee by
funded
researchers
every 6
months

Critical Issues
• Requirement Formatted:
on
Indent: Left: 0",
public sector Hanging: 0.12", Bulleted + Level: 1
researchers’ + Aligned at: 0" + Tab after: 0.25"
+ Indent at: 0.25", Tabs: 0.12", List
participation in
tab + Not at 0.25"
granted projects
• Available
budget is lesser
than firms’
demand
• Researchers do
not have
concern on
duration of
research project
while firms do
• Private sector
investment in
the scheme is
not qualified to
apply for 200%
tax deduction
scheme

81

